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OF MORAL OUTRAGE IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
DUANE RUDOLPH*
Moral outrage is a substantive and remedial feature of our laws,
and the Article addresses three questions overlooked in the scholarly
literature. What do judges mean when they currently express moral
outrage in the remedies portion of their opinions? Should judges ex-
press such moral outrage at all? If so, when? Relying on a branch of
legal philosophy known as hermeneutics that deals with the interpre-
tation and understanding of texts, the Article argues that in inter-
preting and understanding cases judges should express moral outrage
when faced with individuals from communities whose voice has histor-
ically been at risk, is currently at risk, or is likely to be at risk of being
silenced. The Article draws from water law, tort law, employment
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discrimination, property, and family law, among others, to offer the
core insight that moral outrage should be its own emphatic remedy,
and a philosophically informed approach to judicial interpretation
requires expressions of moral outrage from the bench to address on-
going injustice or the threat of injustice directed at vulnerable com-
munities such as women and religious minorities in the current
political climate in the United States.
INTRODUCTION
A. The Kansas-Nebraska Story
B. The Elauf Story
C. The Sheridan Story
D. The Argument
I. REMEDIES OF MORAL OUTRAGE
A. Outrage at Law
B. Outrage at Equity
C. Commentators and Outrage
II. GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS
A. Humanities and Sciences
B. Mediation and Horizons
C. Gadamer’s Interpreters
III. MEANINGS OF MORAL OUTRAGE
A. Outrage as Vociferation
B. Outrage as “Fusion of Horizons”
C. Outrage as Dignity
IV. THIS MOMENT IN MORAL OUTRAGE
A. This Moment in Moral Outrage
B. This Moment in Sexism/Misogyny
C. This Moment in Religious Intolerance
V. APPLICATION OF MORAL OUTRAGE
A. Community or Class
B. Muted or Silenced
C. Emphatic Remedy
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The present political and cultural moment is one of perpetual
outrage. The president is constantly outraged, so much so that he
communicates his displeasure to the world at all hours, and in the pro-
cess, outrages others.1 Members of Congress and their constituents
1. See Stephen Castle, Trump’s Tweets Manage a Rare Feat: Uniting Britain, in
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/europe
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are outraged by this president and this moment in time.2 Members
of both parties are outraged at each other, so much so that they are
shocked, shocked, that the other party and its supporters are doing
what they are doing, which is an incomprehensible way of doing
things, after all.3 Newspapers are appalled, appalled, at what things
have come to under these leaders in this moment in time.4 Americans
are disgusted, disgusted, at how bad things are in Washington [D.C.].5
To live in the United States in this moment is to be angry, appalled,
disgusted, indignant, shocked—that is, outraged—about something,
some things, or about everything.6 Indeed, to not be outraged about
something—even at the amount of outrage in public discourse—might
be considered somewhat anomalous at this moment in time.
Moral outrage is a fixture of our laws.7 It encompasses such doc-
trinal landmarks as “the tort of outrage” (intentional infliction of
emotional distress or IIED), the “shocks the conscience” standard in
constitutional law, contempt proceedings at equity, jury deliberations
in general, and—not so doctrinally—whenever a judge elects to insert
outrage into a case or opinion.8 Moral outrage includes a number of
/trump-tweets-uk-visit.html [https://perma.cc/9VXU-LPEB]; Ben Jacobs, Trump Uses
Twitter to Bash New York Times Coverage and Letter to Subscribers, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13,
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/13/trump-twitter-new-york-times
[https://perma.cc/57A7-UUGN].
2. See, e.g., Burgess Everett & Rachael Bade, Conservatives Floored by Trump’s Gun
Control Lovefest, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2018, 6:49PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018
/03/01/trump-gun-control-conservatives-gop-nra-432783 [https://perma.cc/A29A-RYLF];
Tom Howell, Jr., Conservatives outraged at Trump’s Funding to Subsidize Obamacare
Insurers, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/feb
/18/donald-trumps-obamacare-funds-anger-conservatives [https://perma.cc/5V9C-Y9SC].
3. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, You’re Wrong! I’m Right!, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/opinion/sunday/liberal-conservative-divide.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3GA-7264]; Sean Sullivan, Sen. Orrin Hatch apologizes for calling
Obamacare supporters “dumbass” people, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/03/02/sen-orrin-hatch-apologizes-for-calling
-obamacare-supporters-dumbass-people/?utm_term=.8c46ceb5d817 [https://perma.cc
/4N2L-2JSF].
4. See, e.g., Trump’s ‘Best People’ and Their Dubious Ethics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/opinion/trump-best-people-ethics.html [https://
perma.cc/X4QU-VRZ2]; Paul Krugman, The Uses of Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/opinion/the-uses-of-outrage.html [https://perma
.cc/P4Y8-GT66].
5. See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, Voters Angry at Washington Gridlock May Want to
Look in the Mirror, NPR (Oct. 1, 2012, 1:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpoli
tics/2012/10/01/162084449/voters-angry-at-washington-gridlock-may-want-to-look-in-the
-mirror [https://perma.cc/6AJB-G8CJ].
6. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, The Real Roots of American Rage, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/charles-duhigg-american
-anger/576424 [https:perma.cc/7Z3V-9NHM].
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Outrage, 2 UTAH L. REV. 717, 717–18 (2002).
8. See infra Part I.
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remedies including punitive and compensatory damage awards, as
well as injunctions, among others.9 That is, both substantively and
remedially, moral outrage is a mainstay of our laws and our courts
use these legal tools daily.10
In engaging with these legal tools, commentators have mainly
focused on public expressions of outrage embodied in a number of
substantive areas, including constitutional law, corporate governance,
criminal law, environmental law, remedies law, securities law, and
tort law, among others.11 Much attention has been devoted to puni-
tive damage awards, in particular, and very little to expressions of
judicial outrage in the remedies phase of a proceeding or opinion.12
Indeed, judicial outrage has also received scant attention from reme-
dies scholars despite the centuries-deep trajectory of remedies law.13
For the purposes of my argument, judicial outrage includes not only
what the judge herself does but also how she interacts with the work
of the jury and the legislature.
Given the existence of moral outrage in our laws, the question
becomes one of channeling. However discomfiting moral outrage might
be, to what uses should judges put the outrage that is already avail-
able to them in our legal system, and when, for whom, why, and how
should they do so? Since commentators have largely focused on the
9. See id.
10. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 717–18.
11. For constitutional law, see Andrew Coan, Well, Should They?: A Response to If
People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213,
213–16 (2007) (public outrage); Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their
Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157 (2007) (public outrage). For
corporate governance, see LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PER-
FORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 64–66 (2006)
(“outrage constraint,” which limits managerial arrangements); Miriam H. Baer, Choosing
Punishment, 32 B.U. L. REV. 577, 583 (2012) [hereinafter Baer, Choosing Punishment]
(public outrage). For criminal law, see Baer, Choosing Punishment, supra, at 589 (public
outrage); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 718 (the public and outrage). On the expressive func-
tion of punishment in criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598, 602–03 (1996) (public morality, values, and social mean-
ings of punishment as expressive language). For environmental law, see Christopher H.
Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of Federal Environ-
mental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV 251, 255 (1993) (“the morally outraged”);
David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational
Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 929–30 (2001) (public outrage).
For remedies law, see Sunstein, supra note 7, at 718 (the public and outrage); Cass R.
Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes
on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2095–96 (1998) [hereinafter
Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages] (public outrage). For securities law, see Baer, Choosing
Punishment, supra, at 621–24 (public outrage). For tort law, see Sunstein, supra note
7, at 718; see also Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1077
(2003) (shocks the conscience); Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Stan-
dard of Outrage, 54 MD. L. REV. 183, 183, 225, 228 (1995) (tort law).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See id.
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substantive dimension of moral outrage, my argument dwells on its
remedial implications, which bears on every other area of the law.14
The range of cases selected in this Article attests not only to the
omnipresence of remedies in American law but also to the centrality
of remedies in the resolution of a diversity of legal disputes from
areas as divergent as water law and family law, among others.15
Remedies matter because whenever we discuss a substantive claim
in any area of the law we also imply a remedy the plaintiff seeks.
The remedy is the anticipated judicial result that informs and often
frames the outcome of the dispute, and it often determines whether
a case should be brought in the first place or not.16
My argument is straightforward. A philosophically grounded
approach to legal interpretation (hermeneutics) underscores the ne-
cessity of expressions of moral outrage when the human dignity of
vulnerable communities is at risk, such as women and religious mi-
norities, in a range of selected cases.17 The three anchor cases on
which I rely reflect when judicial moral outrage would be appropriate
and when it would be misguided.18 Two cases are federal cases (water
rights, employment discrimination) that were decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and one is a state law case (family law)
that did not reach the state’s highest court.19 The cases attest to the
conditions under which moral outrage is appropriate and when its
expression is misguided.20
14. Id.
15. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 448 (2015); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d
1067, 1068–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 717–18.
16. See Douglas Laycock, Introduction to Symposium, Remedies: Justice and the
Bottom Line, 27 REV. LITIG. 1, 2 (2007). As Laycock observes, it is the pursuit of a remedy
that makes a lawsuit meaningful:
The remedy is what the client gets, the practical payoff of litigation, the
bottom line of justice. Even when the client cares about the precedent, the
precedent is important because it will lead to the grant or denial of remedies
in future cases, and because the deterrent effect of those remedies, or the
prospect of not having to worry about any more remedies, will guide the
defendant’s behavior. Without the prospect of an effective remedy, a claim
of right is meaningless.
Id.
17. On the human dignity of vulnerable communities, see David Luban, Human
Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 263, 273–74 (Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo, eds., 2015) [herein-
after Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism]; David Luban, Human Dignity, Humiliation
and Torture, 19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 211, 220 (2009); David Luban, Lawyers as
Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
815, 838 (2005) [hereinafter Luban, Lawyers as Upholders]; Duane Rudolph, Workers,
Dignity, and Equitable Tolling, 15 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 126, 139, 148, 158 (2017).
18. See infra Introduction.D.
19. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1048–49 (U.S. 2015); EEOC v. Abercrom-
bie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (U.S. 2015); Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1068.
20. See infra Introduction.D.
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A. The Kansas-Nebraska Story
Kansas and Nebraska were signatories to an interstate water
compact apportioning water in the Republican River Basin, which
straddles the boundaries between Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas.21
The compact apportioned roughly 40% of the Basin’s water to Kansas,
roughly 49% to Nebraska, and roughly 11% to Colorado.22 In the first
lawsuit, Kansas faulted Nebraska’s sinking of several thousand wells
in the Basin that depleted groundwater in an area that produces
wheat and corn, among other crops.23 The Supreme Court of the
United States agreed with Kansas and the states negotiated a settle-
ment.24 Within five years of the settlement, the states again relied on
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to resolve their complaints
about each other’s conduct.25 This time, Kansas argued that Nebraska
“had substantially exceeded its allocation of water” and Nebraska
contested how water was accounted for under the settlement agree-
ment.26 Kansas requested monetary and injunctive relief and Ne-
braska modification of the accounting procedures governing water
use in the Basin.27
B. The Elauf Story
Samantha Elauf, a seventeen-year-old Muslim, applied for a job
as a “model” in 2008 at an Abercrombie & Fitch Kids Store in a Tulsa,
Oklahoma mall.28 Abercrombie & Fitch (Abercrombie) refused to hire
Ms. Elauf because she wore a head scarf or hijab, which the retail
chain deemed would violate its “Look Policy” prohibiting “hats” or
“caps” of any kind.29 Based on their sex, Abercrombie’s sales associ-
ates, known as “models,” were required to observe certain dress codes;
these requirements did not apply to job applicants.30
21. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1049–50.
24. Id. at 1050.
25. Id. at 1050–51.
26. Id.
27. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1051.
28. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275–76 (N.D.
Okla. 2011).
29. Id. at 1275, 1278, 1283 n.6.
30. Id. at 1275 (“[Abercrombie requires] employees to dress in clothing and merchandise
consistent with that sold in the store; requires that male employees be clean shaven; pro-
hibits female employees from wearing necklaces and bracelets; requires employees to wear
specific types of shoes; and prohibits ‘caps’ but does not mention any other head wear.”).
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Ms. Elauf had chosen to wear a hijab since puberty as she con-
sidered it “a representation and reminder of her faith, a religious
symbol, a symbol of Islam and of modesty.”31 For religious reasons,
Ms. Elauf did not drink, gamble, or party; she prayed and read the
Quran twice a month; prayed and fasted during Ramadan; and she
tried to wear clothing that covered most of her arms and legs.32 To
her interview Ms. Elauf wore a black hijab, “an Abercrombie & Fitch
like T-shirt and jeans,” and her interviewer testified that she had pre-
viously seen Ms. Elauf wear a hijab around the mall; Abercrombie
disapproved of the color black for models’ clothing.33 Disapproving
of Ms. Elauf’s hijab, the district manager allegedly ordered that Ms.
Elauf’s interview evaluation scores be retroactively lowered to make
her ineligible for hiring, which was done.34
On Ms. Elauf’s behalf, the United States Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit against Abercrombie,
alleging workplace religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) & (3)) and Title I
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 1981a).35 The EEOC
“sought injunctive relief, back pay, and damages.”36 Under federal law,
absent the likelihood of undue hardship on its business, Abercrombie
was required to make a reasonable accommodation of Ms. Elauf’s
sincerely held religious beliefs, which would include accepting her
wearing a hijab in the workplace.37
31. Id. at 1276, 1284 (Ms. Elauf also testified that not all women in her family wore
a hijab).
32. Id. at 1276.
33. Id. at 1277.
34. Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
35. Id. at 1275, 1282 (In discrimination cases, Title VII imposes a burden-shifting
regime on employee and employer, known as “McDonnell Douglas burden shifting.” As
rehearsed in Abercrombie: “First, the plaintiff initially bears the burden of production
with respect to a prima facie case by showing that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief
that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) she informed the employer of this
belief; and (3) she was not hired for failing to comply with the employment requirement.
The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must: (1) conclusively rebut one or more
elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, (2) show that it offered a reasonable accom-
modation, or (3) show that it was unable to accommodate the employee’s religious needs
reasonably without undue hardship.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
36. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
37. See Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1282, 1285 (indicating that the reasonable
accommodation discussion initiates an “interactive process of accommodation” between
employer and employee); see also Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm [https://perma.cc/A7GH-BH56]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“An accommodation may cause undue hardship if it is costly,
compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights
of other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their share of poten-
tially hazardous or burdensome work.”).
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C. The Sheridan Story
Suzanne E. Sheridan and Charles L. Sheridan’s twelve-year
marriage was a “rags-to-riches affair” that reverted to rags in 1989.38
The New Jersey couple’s “economic rollercoaster ride” was the result
of unreported income obtained from Mr. Sheridan’s work as a truck
driver in which position he “conspired with his employer to skim large
corporate and institutional oil deliveries (billing for more oil than
delivered).39 Mr. Sheridan and his employer “would then sell the un-
delivered, excess oil to third entities.”40 The illicit income allowed the
Sheridan family to abandon their home and its furnishings to foreclo-
sure following which they purchased a new home with cash taken
out of a paper bag.41 “From a safety-deposit box, a shoe box, a dog
biscuit box and from other hiding places, more cash withdrawals fol-
lowed. Occasionally, they even withdrew funds from a checking or
savings account, those withdrawals being primarily cash.”42 Under
oath, Mr. Sheridan lied about the source of his income, and it became
clear that the family had not paid any taxes.43 Mr. Sheridan had
also been abusive to Mrs. Sheridan, and he had periodically as-
saulted her.44 Their illicit earnings spent, Mr. Sheridan was now
unemployed and the family went hungry.45 As everything collapsed,
Mrs. Sheridan sued under state law for divorce based on extreme
cruelty; equitable division of marital assets; and for alimony, attor-
neys’ fees, and child support.46
D. The Argument
Although moral outrage should have been expressed in both
Sheridan (family law) and Abercrombie (employment discrimination),
only the Sheridan court expressed moral outrage and for the wrong
reasons.47 Relying on public morality, conscience, and public policy,
the Sheridan court denied Mrs. Sheridan the equitable distribution
38. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1069 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990). Given
how much the opinion both fascinates and disturbs me, I have briefly discussed the
Sheridan case in a previous paper but do so at a greater length here. See Duane Rudolph,
Why Prior Appropriation Needs Equity, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 348, 386–87 (2015).
39. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1069.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1069–70.
42. Id. at 1069.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1075.
45. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1075.
46. Id.
47. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1048–49 (U.S. 2015); EEOC v. Abercrom-
bie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (U.S. 2015); Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1069.
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of the illicit marital assets.48 The court held that an equitable court
was “an impermissible forum for the division of marital property
primarily purchased with funds from illegal activities.”49 Given that
“it is repugnant to [judges’] oath that [they] sit mute in the face of
acknowledged, demonstrated or potential wrongdoing,” the court took
the extraordinary step of reporting the Sheridans’ failure to divulge
their illegal income to the relevant authorities after citing the state’s
Code of Judicial Conduct at some length.50 “We do not reward wrong-
doers!” the outraged court exclaimed.51 The court found that the state
and federal governments were “potential innocent entities” in the
Sheridan case and it granted both leave to intervene.52 Finally, the
appalled court exclaimed at the fact that Mr. Sheridan “just did not
bother to get a job!”53 Relying in part on Blackstone, the court then
awarded Mrs. Sheridan alimony, child support, and attorneys’ fees.54
For their part, all three federal Abercrombie courts failed to ex-
press moral outrage.55 Since her beliefs were sincerely held, since
Ms. Elauf had provided Abercrombie with notice of her need for an
accommodation of her religious beliefs, and since Abercrombie had
not shown that it would face undue hardship by accommodating Ms.
Elauf’s beliefs, the trial court denied summary judgment to Aber-
crombie.56 At a trial on damages, $20,000 in compensatory damages
were awarded but prospective injunctive relief was denied.57 On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
Abercrombie prevailed on the basis that Ms. Elauf had failed to pro-
vide Abercrombie with the necessary notice or knowledge of her need
for a reasonable accommodation.58 The Supreme Court of the United
States subsequently held that, for her to succeed under a disparate
treatment theory for employment discrimination under Title VII,
Ms. Elauf need not show that Abercrombie had actual knowledge of
her need for an accommodation but instead that her need for an
accommodation was a motivating factor in Abercrombie’s decision
to deny her employment.59
48. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1075–77.
49. Id. at 1068.
50. Id. at 1073.
51. Id. at 1071.
52. Id. at 1075.
53. Id.
54. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1076.
55. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (U.S. 2015); EEOC
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013); EEOC v. Abercrombie
& Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (N.D. Okla. 2011).
56. Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–87.
57. Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1115.
58. Id. at 1116.
59. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032.
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Even though Nebraska had “blithely proceeded” to ignore Kan-
sas’s water rights, the Kansas court similarly did not express out-
rage.60 The Supreme Court of the United States agreed that
Nebraska’s “misbehavior” had resulted in its overconsumption of its
water rights by 17%, which “resulted in a $3.7 million loss to Kansas,”
and also that “Nebraska recklessly gambled with Kansas’s rights,
consciously disregarding a substantial probability that its actions
would deprive Kansas of the water to which it was entitled.”61 Indeed,
the court had already found that Nebraska had breached Kansas’s
water rights in a preceding lawsuit.62 However, the court denied
Kansas’s request for treble damages, full disgorgement of Nebraska’s
gains, and an injunction in this case.63 Exercising its equitable powers,
the court ordered $3.7 million for Kansas for its losses, an additional
$1.8 million in partial disgorgement of Nebraska’s gains since water
was sold at much higher rates in Nebraska, and the court agreed to
changes in the accounting procedures on Nebraska’s behalf.64
Indeed, given that Kansas was a lawsuit between states, the case
correctly did not express moral outrage.65 Sheridan (family law) and
Abercrombie (employment discrimination), on the other hand, were
wrong not to do so when presented with disenfranchised individuals.
Outrage should have been expressed in both Sheridan and Abercrom-
bie but neither for the reasons espoused by the Sheridan court nor on
behalf of the parties identified as “innocent” victims (the state and
federal governments) in the same case.66 Sheridan involved a battered
woman subject to domestic violence who was wholly dependent on
her spouse for her financial well-being.67 As such, outrage should
have been voiced on Mrs. Sheridan’s behalf. Sidestepping the do-
mestic violence in the case, Sheridan expressed outrage instead over
seeking a remedy after failing to report income, but not about the
physical violence that was directed at a woman.68 Moral outrage
should also have been expressed in the Abercrombie federal cases on
behalf of a Muslim, a woman, and a teenager (Ms. Elauf) who had
been discriminated against—a clear violation of federal law—by a
powerful retail chain.69 While Kansas involved a key resource on
which all life depends, expressions of moral outrage should be reserved
60. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056 (U.S. 2015).
61. Id. at 1053, 1055–56.
62. Id. at 1050.
63. Id. at 1058.
64. Id. at 1058, 1059.
65. Id. at 1055–57.
66. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
67. Id. at 1069–70.
68. Id.
69. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (U.S. 2015).
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for cases involving human beings and not involving state or institu-
tional entities.70
Not only does my Article identify moral outrage as a legitimate
remedial result but it also addresses the normative question regard-
ing the conditions under which moral outrage should be expressed,
and this, significantly, by relying on a branch of philosophy known
as hermeneutics. In Part I, I show how moral outrage is already part
of remedies law. In Part II, I deploy the work of the German philoso-
pher, Hans Georg Gadamer, to show that Gadamer’s insights regard-
ing how we understand and interpret cases (hermeneutics or the art
of understanding) are relevant to a legal discussion of moral outrage.
Gadamer’s philosophical approach to hermeneutics is distinctive
because it calls on the interpreter of a text (the one whose task it is
to apply her understanding to a given text, like a judge) to acknowl-
edge and confront the particular traditions and prejudices under
which she labors and to account for their bearing on the interpretive
exercise she undertakes at a given moment in time.71 Gadamer’s
focus on the situation of the particular interpreter is powerful because
it asks the interpreter to struggle with her own historical context or
horizon as well as the traditions and prejudices that sustain that
context as she approaches a given case or text.72 The interpreter’s
task is to transcend the limitations of the traditions and prejudices in
which she is steeped.73 While it already has a powerful footprint in the
legal literature, Gadamer’s work has yet to be applied to discussions
of moral outrage in judicial opinions, which I do for the first time here.
Part III draws from Gadamer’s work and argues that moral
outrage involves judicial vociferation of its rejection of misconduct
at a given moment in time. That a judge expresses moral outrage at
all tells us about that judge, about the context that she brings to her
legal interpretation, and indeed about her particular context as it
meets that of the case before her. Gadamer calls the encounter be-
tween judge and case the “fusion of horizons,” and I argue that moral
outrage puts such a fusion of horizons on display.74 Fundamentally,
my argument is about the deployment of moral outrage in the ser-
vice of human dignity, which is why a court like Sheridan is wrong
to express moral outrage on behalf of an aggrieved party like the
government, a sovereign party. When it comes to expressions of moral
outrage, human dignity should trump concerns about sovereign and
institutional dignity.
70. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1048–49 (U.S. 2015).
71. See infra Part II.
72. See infra Part II.
73. See infra Part II.
74. See infra Part II.
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Given the obstinacy of noxious traditions of sexism/misogyny and
islamophobia/religious intolerance in current American life (to name
issues directly raised by Sheridan and Abercrombie), applying
Gadamer’s insights allows me to focus on the need for moral outrage
from the bench at this moment in time so as to emphatically in-
crease the opportunities for judicial redress for social injustices long
directed at vulnerable communities and to deter the targeting of
individuals from such at risk communities.75 Such an emphasis also
explains why the necessity for moral outrage is obviated in a case
like Kansas (water rights), no matter how irksome Nebraska’s con-
duct might appear in a water rights case, since Kansas involves a
lawsuit between states.76 Part IV thus focuses on both judicial and
social commentary regarding key social issues embedded in this
particular moment to which judges and jurors approaching cases
like Sheridan and Abercrombie must be both sensitive responsive
under Gadamer’s philosophical model.
My argument extends groundbreaking work by Georgia Warnke,
Francis J. Moots, III, and William N. Eskridge, among many others,
in the area of philosophical hermeneutics.77 In the area of remedies,
it builds on similarly influential work by Margo Schlanger, Cass R.
Sunstein, and Henry E. Smith, among others.78 My project empow-
ers judges to express moral outrage on behalf of certain groups but
only under limited circumstances. As such, my argument also builds
on Martha Nussbaum’s powerful work on emotion in the law.79
Specifically, a judge should, I argue in Part V, reserve her moral
outrage for cases involving individuals from communities or classes
that have been (1)(i) historically threatened or at risk; (ii) that are
currently threatened or at risk; or (iii) that are likely to be threatened
or at risk; and (2) whose voices have (i) been historically silenced or
muted; (ii) are currently silenced or muted; or (iii) that risk being
silenced or muted. Such a test would not cover governments or similar
parties suing each other (à la Kansas).
75. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015); Sheridan
v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
76. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1055–57 (2015).
77. See infra Part II.
78. See infra Part I.
79. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 5, 13 (2004) (exploring the roles of disgust and shame in the law because “law without
appeals to emotion is virtually unthinkable.”); see also Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative,
and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 367–68 (1996) (relying on Nuss-
baum’s work and observing that “The law perpetuates the illusion of emotionless lawyering
and judging by portraying certain ‘hard’ emotions or emotional stances as objective and
inevitable. Yet even a legal process devoid of such ‘soft’ emotions as compassion or empathy
is not emotionless; it is simply driven by other passions”).
2020] OF MORAL OUTRAGE IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 347
The test I propose would embolden expressions of moral outrage
when communities at risk are targeted in any substantive area of
our laws since outrage is about the voicing of displeasure (and even
disgust and anger) in the service of a cause.80 Women and religious
communities, for example, meet these requirements because these
are the kinds of communities that have long been relegated to what
Christine Desan refers to as “marchlands” in another context, that is,
the peripheries of legal and social discourse.81 It is time we brought
these communities back from the “marchlands” to the center of our
legal discussions by conscripting powerful remedial tools in the ser-
vice of their inherent human dignity.82
Under the model that I propose, once the test outlined above is
met, a presumption will exist in favor of an aggrieved individual from
such a vulnerable community that an outrage remedy should issue,
and the effect of that presumption will be to strengthen the case for
the requested remedy. Indeed, the presumption may increase the
amount of damages available to that individual under the facts of a
given case. No legislative act is necessary to empower judges to ex-
press moral outrage since they often already do so as a matter of
public policy (à la Sheridan).83 Judges unsettled about relying on pub-
lic policy might locate authority to express moral outrage on digni-
tary grounds in recent constitutional precedent from the Supreme
Court of the United States that favors dignitarian approaches to
individuals from historically vulnerable communities.84 At its most
fundamental level, my argument wishes to provoke open and trans-
parent discussion within our remedies laws of the injustices under
which marginalized communities have long toiled and despaired.
Given the doctrinal elements of my argument—it is after all a
doctrinal reworking of our remedies laws as they stand—it might be
criticized for its doctrinal bent. But the doctrinal aspect is at the ser-
vice of the Article’s normative power, given the Article’s original re-
liance on philosophical hermeneutics as it opposes and seeks to deter
expressions of ingrained prejudices or those that might become in-
grained.85 Doctrine is a potent tool in our endeavors to uproot and
80. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 79, at 6–8, 10–12; Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of
Moral Indignation on Law, 33 VERMONT L. REV. 405, 407, 408 (2009) (associating outrage
with indignation, which may involve anger, disgust, and contempt).
81. See Christine A. Desan, Writing Constitutional History Beyond the Institu-
tional/Ideological Divide, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 391, 395 (1998).
82. See id.
83. See Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1069 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
84. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice,
and Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4, 7 (2017).
85. See infra Part II.
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discard injustice.86 As Todd Rakoff has argued, “[i]t is one thing to say
that doctrine is not the only thing that matters, and quite another
to claim that doctrine does not matter at all. The first contention is
true; the second is false.”87 Doctrine matters because it “highlights
certain social processes and hides others; doctrine sets the terms on
which some voices will be heard, and others will be kept silent; doc-
trine creates incentives for certain kinds of behavior out of court;
doctrine establishes an image of where the psychological center of a
lawsuit lies.”88 Doctrine thus matters, and I explore the extent to
which it matters in this Article, while advancing the normative
framework to which the doctrinal element is subordinated.
My conclusion follows.
I. REMEDIES OF MORAL OUTRAGE
Outrage has long been an essential element of American remedies
law.89 Commentators, however, have long overlooked its importance.90
The focus on remedies is central to my argument because, although
American law casts “outrage” in both substantive and remedial terms,
given my focus on outrage as a remedy, I focus solely on the remedial
dimension of moral outrage.91
Even after the merger of law and equity in American law in
1938 under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, American courts have
generally observed distinctions between two types of remedies, that
is, legal and equitable remedies.92 The availability of a remedy at law
86. See Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 98 (1994).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 63.
89. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 826–32 (2000).
90. See Toni M. Massaro & Ellen Elizabeth Brooks, Flint of Outrage, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 155, 184 (2017).
91. Substantively, for example, “outrage” includes both “the tort of outrage” (inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress or “IIED”) and the “shocks the conscience” standard
in constitutional law. On outrage in IIED cases, see DOBBS, supra note 89. On outrage
in “shocks the conscience” in constitutional law, see Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro,
Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 281, 284, 287 (2015) (focusing both on the
outrageousness test in constitutional law (also known as the “shocks the conscience” test)
and on the irrationality test to argue that they are “close cousins” that “promote justice
in modest steps while maintaining the analytical coherence of the rest of the Consti-
tution”); Massaro & Brooks, supra note 90 (discussing the “shocks the conscience” test
in the context of the Flint water crisis, which was “an outrage of epic proportion”).
92. On the merger of law and equity in 1938 under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
see Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1184 (2005).
On distinctions between legal and equitable remedies, see Samuel L. Bray, The System
of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 536 (2015) (arguing in favor of the con-
tinued importance of equitable remedies post-merger); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden
& Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent
2020] OF MORAL OUTRAGE IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 349
(a “legal” remedy) often implies the availability of monetary damages
in that case.93 The availability of a remedy at equity (an “equitable”
remedy) often implies the deployment of the court’s coercive powers
in ways that often do not require awards of monetary damages.94 I
begin first with the discussion of moral outrage at law before dis-
cussing moral outrage at equity.
A. Outrage at Law
Although some courts warn that a “judge may not permit his or
her sense of moral outrage . . . to overwhelm the legal process,” out-
rage is an integral part of American legal remedies.95 Traditionally,
the legal remedy most associated with moral outrage is punitive dam-
ages awards.96 Punitive or exemplary damages are extra-compensa-
tory monetary awards whose function is both to deter and punish.97
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 249 (2012) (criticizing the equitable jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court of the United States).
93. For legal remedies often not involving monetary damages but including a coercive
aspect, see DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 165, 585
(2d ed. 1993) (replevin for repossession of chattel to be contrasted with equitable injunc-
tions; prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition issued by law
courts as opposed to equity courts).
94. By “equity” I mean an approach to litigants’ facts that originated in Medieval
English law and that continues in American law as a distinct class of remedies generally
distinguished from monetary damages. On the history of equity, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN
ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL IN-
STITUTIONS 268–70 (2009). For arguments against the endurance of equitable remedies
post-merger of law and equity, see DOBBS, supra note 93, at 51 (rejecting “equitable”
remedies as “anomalous” post-merger); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARA-
BLE INJURY RULE 6–11 (1992) (arguing that courts no longer enforce the irreparable injury
rule, which separates legal from equitable remedies in cases suing for an injunction (an
equitable remedy)). On the coercive power of equitable remedies, see DOBBS, supra note
93, at 49. On the availability of monetary damages at equity, see DOBBS, supra note 93,
at 370 (noting that restitution, which involves awards of damages, can be either legal or
equitable, depending on the circumstances.). On “compensatory contempt” (also involving
grants of monetary damages) at equity, see Doug Rendleman, Rejecting Property Rules-
Liability Rules for Boomer’s Nuisance Remedy: The Last Tour You Need of Calabresi and
Melamed’s Cathedral, at *28 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series,
Paper No. 2013-02, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstract_id=2212384.
95. See State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203, 1228 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
96. Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 84 MINN. L. REV. 83,
102 (2007).
97. See DOBBS, supra note 93, at 312; Alexandra B. Klass, The Expansion of Punitive
Damages in Minnesota: Environmental Litigation After Jensen v. Walsh, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 177, 180 (2003); Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages after Exxon
Shipping Company v. Baker: The Quest for Predictability and the Role of Juries, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. J. 182, 183 (2009); Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm,
84, 90 MINN. L. REV. 83 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L. J. 347, 351 (2003); Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages, supra note
11, at 2122.
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They can also vindicate societal interests in a given case.98 Inasmuch
as they can express anger or indignation, punitive damages awards
also “have an expressive function.”99 As a matter of law, punitive
damages are generally available in cases involving “outrage and
humiliation.”100 Typical punitive damages cases involve medical and
legal malpractice, toxic tort, and products liability.101
Given the ostensible elasticity of the “outrage” element in puni-
tive damages cases, punitive awards have courted controversy as
well as constitutional review since courts worry about unreasonable
and disproportionate punitive jury awards.102 Courts reviewing puni-
tive damages awards often deploy a “shocks the conscience” test for
such awards.103 Thus, punitive damages imply two outrage compo-
nents.104 First, to warrant an award of punitive damages, outrage
must be imputed to the defendant’s objectionable act, and, second,
to warrant an overturning of (or reduction in) a grant of punitive
damages, outrage must be imputed to the award of punitive dam-
ages itself.105 Findings of outrageousness thus persist in American
legal remedies in punitive damages cases.106
Outrage also plays a role in compensatory damages awards.107
Traditionally, compensatory damages, also known as actual damages,
are meant to make the plaintiff whole by placing her in the position
98. Sharkey, supra note 97, at 453.
99. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages, supra note 11, at 2086, 2096.
100. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003); see also
Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Mas. 2009) (“While discrimination
of all types is wrong and unacceptable, certain discriminatory conduct is more outrageous
than others. Punitive damages have been, and remain, permissible only where the defen-
dant’s behavior is particularly outrageous or egregious.”); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co.,
563 N.E.2d 397, 398, 402 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts) (“Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”);
Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435–36 (Fla. 1978) (“A legal basis for punitive
damages exists where torts are committed in an outrageous manner or with fraud, malice,
wantonness or oppression.”).
101. DOBBS, supra note 93, at 317.
102. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 412 (reviewing punitive
damages award under Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (same); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
562–63 (1995) (same); Txo Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993)
(same); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (same).
103. May v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 806, 815–16 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 538 U.S. 408 (2003) and applying three-factor test to determine
whether punitive damages award “shocks the conscience”); Bachrach v. Covenant Transp.
Inc., 636 Fed. Appx. 404, 406 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Arizona courts have also allowed remit-
titur of punitive damages when the remittitur shocks the conscience.”) (italics in original).
104. See May, 852 F.3d at 816.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 815–16; Bachrach, 636 Fed. Appx. 404, 406–07.
107. See DOBBS, supra note 93, at 312.
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in which she would have been had she not been injured by the de-
fendant.108 Actual damages awards typically allow recovery for medical
expenses, lost wages, as well as pain and suffering.109 So as to pre-
vent windfalls to the plaintiff, courts often require that all damages
claims arising from the same transaction be litigated at the same
time.110 Courts also often require that actual damages be awarded
before an award for punitive damages can be made.111 Nevertheless,
compensatory damages can include a punitive element, which incor-
porates outrage.112 As the Supreme Court of the United States has
stated in reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “[c]ompensa-
tory damages, however, already contain this punitive element.”113
Thus, the outrage element exists in both punitive and compensatory
legal remedies.
B. Outrage at Equity
Equity, the other half of American remedies law, also incorpo-
rates the outrage element.114 While punitive damages have tradi-
tionally been considered legal remedies (given their monetary
nature), courts sitting at equity have also awarded punitive dam-
ages, making punitive damages and their outrage element equitable
as well.115 More usually, however, outrage at equity is associated
with contempt of court proceedings where, for example, a pro se
litigant continually interrupts testimony and the court orders her
“to put her hand over her mouth, or to have her mouth taped, until
the witness ha[s] answered the question.”116 When the litigant dis-
regards the court’s order and informs the court that it has been
“threatening” her throughout the proceedings, the court finds her in
contempt.117 When she disregards court orders a day later and calls
108. See id. at 209.
109. See id. at 211–12.
110. See id. at 210.
111. See id. at 215, 315.
112. See id. at 312 (“Punitive damages may have some incidental compensatory ef-
fects; and ‘compensatory’ damages may have some incidental punitive effects.”).
113. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment c, p. 466 (1977)) (“In many cases in which
compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, such as humiliation
or indignation aroused by the defendant’s act, there is no clear line of demarcation
between punishment and compensation and a verdict for a specified amount frequently
includes elements of both.”)).
114. See David L. Feldman & Michelle Whitman, As if Equity Mattered—Common
Themes and Enduring Issues in the Symposium, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291, 294 (2010).
115. See DOBBS, supra note 93, at 315.
116. Naunchek v. Naunchek, 463 A.2d 603, 605 (Conn. 1983).
117. Id.
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witnesses liars, the court finds her conduct “absolutely outrageous.”118
After she refuses to apologize to a witness for calling him a liar and
thus “purge herself of contempt,” the court subsequently orders her
imprisoned.119 Contempt is also found where a litigant’s “outrageous
conduct” involves calling the judge by an “obscene name,” denigrat-
ing the court, and where the litigant’s conduct also involves stating
that the court was “railroading him.”120 Thus, outrage thrives in
both punitive damages and contempt cases at equity.
Injunctions, another coercive remedy, also exist to quash outra-
geous conduct at equity.121 In asking courts to grant injunctive relief,
litigants themselves use the language of outrage.122 Litigants request
injunctions to prevent “outrageous conduct” “designed to annoy, tor-
ment, pester, plague, molest, worry, badger, harry, heckle, persecute,
irk, bully, bullyrag, vex, disquiet, grate, bother, tease, nettle, tantalize,
ruffle, assault, display obnoxious behavior or disturb the [plaintiffs’]
peace . . . .”123 Injunctions issue to stop “outrageous and inflamma-
tory” remarks made by a party to a bankruptcy proceeding.124 They
issue to prevent the “outrageous” and involuntary submission of
individuals to vaccination in the absence of proof of the medication’s
effectiveness and safety.125 Injunctions also issue to stop the “outra-
geous” non-provision of appropriate food medication to diabetic
inmates.126 Equity thus anticipates a litigant’s outrage and it makes
a variety of remedies available to litigants able to prove that their
outrage is legally significant, including punitive damages, contempt,
and injunction remedies.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Butler v. State, 330 So. 2d 244, 245 (Ct. App. Fl. 1976) (“Appellant continued his
outburst, expanding his original description of the judge and offering to assault the judge
if his handcuffs were removed. By the time appellant ceased his performance he had
accumulated six counts of contempt.”).
121. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as a Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism,
at *9 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13
/paper/cfm?abstract_id=2617413 [https://perma.cc/E7W2-TQDY].
122. See Hanson v. Estell, 997 P.2d 426, 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
123. Id.
124. See Patriot Grp., LLC v. Fustolo (In re Fustolo), 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 939, *14 n.5
(Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2015).
125. See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17, 19 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing McCargo v.
Vaughn, 778 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1991)) (granting injunction to six civilian em-
ployees of the Department of Defense (DoD) required to receive anthrax vaccine absorbed
without consent because Food and Drug Administration’s determination of vaccine’s
licensing to combat inhalational anthrax on which DoD had relied in mandating involun-
tary immunization had not followed the procedures to certify the vaccination).
126. McCargo v. Vaughn, 778 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (issuing permanent
injunction on the basis of a “finding of defendants’ outrageous unlawful practices” and
“directing defendant prison to establish a system for diabetic inmates to receive special
diets and to assure them access to insulin”).
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C. Commentators and Outrage
In engaging with the outrage element in American remedies
law, commentators have expended considerable effort evaluating the
relationship between public outrage and punitive damages awards
as a remedy at law (as opposed to a remedy at equity).127 Commenta-
tors tell us that public outrage cannot be generated at will and “the
degree of sanction is driven by moral outrage and various cognitive
biases, not by scientific calculations of optimal deterrence. Deter-
rence may . . . be invoked as . . . justification for punishment, but lay
intuitions about culpability and moral outrage . . . outweigh the fac-
tors that ought to matter most under a deterrence-based scheme.”128
Public outrage influences policy makers in the definition of criminal
punishment and it results in irrational punitive jury awards that
are both unpredictable and incoherent.129 Group deliberation in-
creases outrage.130 Public outrage is at the basis of the punitive
intent, which is then “translated” into a legal remedy or outcome.131
Category-bound thinking, exacerbated by the difficulty of “translat-
ing” a moral determination into a legal remedy or outcome, results
in unjust departures from the foundational legal coherence principle
that “the similarly situated [be] treated similarly.”132 Scholars show
that public outrage is expressed in constitutional law, corporate gov-
ernance, criminal law, environmental law, remedies law, securities
law, and tort law, among others.133 In other words, while commenta-
tors have generally focused on public outrage and punitive damages
awards in particular, they have not told us as much about judicial
outrage in remedies law in general, which includes, but is not re-
stricted to punitive damages awards at law and at equity.134
Outrage has also received scant attention from equity’s com-
mentators, despite equity’s history and jurisprudence, which spans
several centuries.135 Flirtatious references to moral outrage appear
in scholarly discussions of equity but no sustained account of the
127. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
171, 171 (2004).
128. Baer, Choosing Punishment, supra note 11, at 588, 589 (footnotes omitted).
129. See Sunstein, supra note 127, at 171 (“When legislators penalize misconduct, they
are typically responsive to the outrage of their constituents.”).
130. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 718.
131. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153,1154–56, 1165–67 (2002).
132. Id. at 1154–56.
133. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
134. See id.
135. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 293–94
(1914).
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remedial importance of outrage at equity has been made.136 Com-
mentators observe that addressing outrage has characterized the
equitable remedy from its founding in the fourteenth century.137
Equity courts themselves have acted outrageously over time leading
to much-needed reforms to the law-equity divide in American law
under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.138 Similarly, equity’s com-
mentators tell us that equity has a strong foundation in morality.139
They tell us that equity courts can be considered courts of outrage.140
But commentators have not focused on the importance of outrage as
an equitable remedy.
Equity’s commentators have focused on the civil rights dimen-
sion of equitable remedies.141 They have argued that equity is a co-
herent remedial system, that it effectively identifies and uproots
opportunistic conduct, and that it upholds human dignity.142 And
136. See T. Leigh Anenson & Donald O. Mayer, Clean Hands and the CEO: Equity as
an Antidote for Excessive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 947, 1009–11 (2010).
137. See WILLIAM F. CLARKE, THE SOUL OF THE LAW 234 (1942); DAVID S. GARLAND ET
AL., THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 151 (2d. ed. 1899) (observing
that equity courts originally acted “to prevent the infliction of outrage and violence, the
remedies of the common law being in many such cases clearly inadequate”); William F.
Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 481 (1938) (equity courts, in the original
sense of the term, targeted conduct “in cases of outrage committed by powerful lords in
clear violation of the common law”). But see Dennis J. Klinck, Lord Eldon on Equity, 20
J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 65 (1999) (doubting that “Lord Eldon [1751–1838, an important chan-
cellor in the history of equity] would ever have acknowledged that ‘moral outrage’ was
part of the equitable jurisdiction; rather there seem to have been cases in which he failed
to restrain or conceal it as a factor in his judgment”).
138. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 351–52
(2009) (observing that equity’s chancellors were sensitive to the discretionary excesses
associated with equitable remedies); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 909, 923, 925, 974 (1987) (providing an overview of the reform movements tar-
geting equity since the 19th century).
139. See DOBBS, supra note 93, at 55; Bray, supra note 92, at 536; Bradley M. Elbein,
The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439,
484–85 (1997); Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 92, at 238; Irit Samet, What Con-
science Can Do for Equity, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 13, 13 (2012); Henry E. Smith, The Equitable
Dimension of Contract, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 903 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Equita-
ble Dimension]; Smith, supra note 121, at *4; Kevin M. Teeven, A Legal History of Binding
Gratuitous Promises at Common Law: Justifiable Reliance and Moral Obligation, 43
DUQ. L. REV. 11, 69 (2004).
140. Rudolph, supra note 38, at 375.
141. On the civil rights component of equitable remedies, see OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1, 4–5 (1978); Margo Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and
How We Should End the Practical Obscurity of Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 515 (2010); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time:
A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 552 (2006); and
Margo Schlanger, The Just Barely Sustainable California Prisoners’ Rights Ecosystem,
664 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 62, 63 (2016).
142. On equity as a system, see Bray, supra note 92, at 536. On equity as targeting
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yet, implicit in all these treatments of equity is what is made both
explicit and the focus of this Article. That is, quashing opportunistic
misconduct so as to uphold human dignity in a civil rights case in
the equitable system, for example, is not incompatible with the ex-
pression of outrage in that case. In fact, a constellation of particularly
egregious facts of the sort emphasized in this Article may compel
the expression of judicial outrage so as to uphold human dignity in
such a case. The question then becomes—and the focus of this Article
is—what does outrage mean in such cases and when should courts
engage in its expression, for whom, and why?
I now turn to the philosophical paradigm that will inform my
discussion of remedial outrage in American law. That approach sug-
gests that it is urgent to rely on such a paradigm in discussions of
moral outrage at this moment in time.
II. GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS
In this section I lay the theoretical groundwork for my discussion
of the necessity for judicial expressions of moral outrage. Relying on
the philosophical hermeneutics of the German philosopher, Hans-
Georg Gadamer, I examine first Gadamer’s approach to a universal
hermeneutics that validates humanistic modes of understanding
texts, including in legal cases. Before situating the importance of my
work among Gadamer’s commentators, I consider the key insights
for which Gadamer remains noteworthy and on which I will rely in
my argument.
A. Humanities and Sciences
Responding to the charge that the humanities must espouse
methodological approaches reminiscent of the sciences, Gadamer’s
groundbreaking and highly influential work argues that understand-
ing and interpretation are inseparable from the individual’s status as
a being in the world no matter her disciplinary perspective.143 Since
opportunistic conduct, see Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 92, at 238; Smith, Equitable
Dimension, supra note 139, at 903; and Smith, supra note 121, at *4. On equity as up-
holding human dignity, see Rudolph, supra note 17, at 130.
143. A fuller discussion of Gadamer’s interpreters follows below in Section II.C. Never-
theless, on the ontological aspect of Gadamer’s hermeneutics and the limits of Gadamer’s
appraisal of science for a reader today, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 614, 617 (1990) (situating Gadamer’s theories and
cautioning that “When Gadamer published his tome in 1960, scientific positivism—the
belief that appropriate use of the scientific method yields objectively truthful facts—was
already on the wane”). On the ontological dimension of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, see also
Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model
of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523,
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the 17th century, Gadamer tells us, the French philosopher René
Descartes’ (“Cartesian”) influence on western thought has been per-
vasive to the detriment of humanistic modes of understanding.144
Cartesian separation of the subjective and the objective led to a privi-
leging of so-called “objective” approaches to interpretation deemed
more “scientific,” “rational,” “unbiased,” and “empirical,” while human-
istic approaches were deprecated as non-rigorous, irrational, biased,
value-laden and, therefore, subordinate to the “superior” scientific
ways of approaching the human experience.145 Our understanding,
Gadamer posits, is an “art,” and the work of interpretation—the
hermeneutic task—which also applies in law, is to appreciate how
all understanding happens.146 Since understanding is universal, the
hermeneutic task is itself universal and is universally applicable.147
Gadamer is concerned that so-called “objective” modes of ap-
proaching texts disparage consideration of the interpreter herself,
her context, and her prejudices, and yet these all shape and condi-
tion the interpreter’s understanding of a given text.148 Nonetheless,
533 (1988) (observing that Gadamer’s insistence on the importance of “play” “reveals our
ontological openness to the world”).
144. See HANS GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 278–79 (Joel Weinshemer &
Donald G. Marshall, trans.) (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]
(observing that Descartes separated subject and object and that Descartes’ idea of method
was that the “methodologically disciplined use of reason can safeguard us from all error”).
Indeed, the deprecation of the humanities remains a pervasive ongoing problem globally
as the humanities and the training that they provide come under sustained attack in the
name of those disciplines that are perceived more profitable. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
NOT FOR PROFIT: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES 143 (2010):
If we do not insist on the crucial importance of the humanities and the arts,
they will drop away, because they do not make money. They only do what
is more precious than that, make a world that is worth living in, people who
are able to see other human beings as full people, with thoughts and feelings
of their own that deserve respect and empathy, and nations that are able to
overcome fear and suspicion in favor of sympathetic and reasoned debate.
145. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 279–80; RICHARD E. PALMER,
HERMENEUTICS 144 (1969) (discussing the “subject-object polarity” in Descartes and its
privileging of the sciences); JENS ZIMMERMANN, HERMENEUTICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUC-
TION 22–23 (2015) (discussing Descartes’ influence and the hermeneutic response to it);
Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J. 491, 499 (1998) (“According to [Gadamer], hermeneutical understanding
has been devalued because it stands outside the empiricist and rationalist accounts of
knowledge, when in fact hermeneutical understanding is the primordial experience of
knowledge that makes possible the derivative experience of scientific thought.”).
146. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 157 (“The classical disci-
pline concerned with the art of understanding texts is hermeneutics.”); see also PALMER,
supra note 145, at 40 (discussing the origins and uses of the “art of understanding” in the
field of hermeneutics).
147. See HANS GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 10–11 (David E.
Linge, ed. & trans.) (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS]
(discussing hermeneutical construction of a “bridge built between the once and the now”).
148. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 22; Mootz, supra note 145, at 500 (“Gadamer’s
principal philosophical claim is that our truthful relation to the world subtends but is
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Gadamer shows, the “rational sciences” are themselves products of
the “art of understanding.”149 The choice of a question to which the
scientific interpreter will devote her research is itself a hermeneutic
question that reflects the traditions and concerns of that interpreter’s
particular time.150 The manner in which the scientific interpreter will
approach her work is also hermeneutic or interpretive because it, too,
is tied to the interpreter’s being in time or history.151 Indeed, the fact
that science communicates through the medium of language under-
scores its interpretive nature.152 Even in the sciences, thus, the her-
meneutic element is present because such an element is bound to the
interpreter’s place in time and it cannot be completely overridden or
uprooted.153 It shapes the questions asked, the manner in which re-
sults are interpreted, and the manner in which they are conveyed to
a general audience.154
Gadamer’s argument does not disparage the sciences.155 His ap-
proach acknowledges the achievements of the sciences but denies that
theirs is the only way of engaging with the human experience.156
Gadamer does not seek to supplant scientific methodology and to pre-
scribe instead methods for either the humanities or other disciplines
to follow.157 His work is about identifying the philosophical bases for
all interpretative understanding and what those bases imply for the
interpreter of any text, including in the sciences.158
B. Mediation and Horizons
But what exactly is “the art of understanding” to which Gadamer
refers and why is it important?159 The art of understanding, Gadamer
not exhausted by modern technical-empirical science and that the Enlightenment picture
of a monadic, prejudice-free subject decoding the world of objects must therefore be
viewed as a mirage.”).
149. See GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 147, at 10–11.
150. See id. at 11 (“Thus what is established by statistics seems to be a language of
facts, but which questions these facts answer and which facts would begin to speak if
other questions were asked are hermeneutical questions.”).
151. See id. at 13 (“[T]he scholar—even the natural scientist—is perhaps not com-
pletely free of custom and society and from all possible factors in his environment.”).
152. See id. at 24 (“Even Descartes, that great and passionate advocate of method and
certainty, is in all his writings an author who uses the means of rhetoric in a magnificent
fashion.”).
153. See id. at 11, 13, 23.
154. See id.
155. See GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 147, at 35.
156. See id. (“But nobody would deny that the practical application of modern science
has fundamentally altered our world, and therewith also our language.”).
157. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at xxvi; Eskridge, supra note
143, at 679; Francis J. Mootz III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Ob-
vious is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REV. 69, 143 (1993); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 6–7.
158. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 7.
159. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 157.
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says, is the act of mediation inherent in all interpretation.160 Media-
tion implies that when an interpreter brings herself to understand a
text she must bridge the gulfs imposed by temporal, cultural, geo-
graphic and other differences separating the text at the moment of
its inscription from the interpreter in the current moment in time.161
Interpretive bridging is necessary because the “texts handed down
to us from the past are wrenched from their original world.”162 That
world is neither coterminous with that of the interpreter nor is it
self-revealing to the interpreter’s interest or curiosity.163 The inter-
preter thus traverses the chasm that would defy her attempts to
bring the text both into her time and her understanding.164 Assidu-
ous as she might be, the interpreter’s temporal location, her situation
vis-à-vis the moment of the text’s inscription, prevents her from ex-
cavating, resurrecting, and imposing the text’s true past on the
present.165 What she can and should do, instead, is thus bring the text
and its past into “thoughtful mediation with contemporary life.”166
Given that understanding is mediation by a given interpreter, me-
diation is meaning at work.167 Gadamer’s dated use—by his own
admission—of the example of the “North American Eskimo tribes” is
telling.168 The “Eskimo tribes,” Gadamer tells us, have a history “cer-
tainly quite independent of whether and when these tribes had an ef-
fect on the ‘universal history of Europe.’ ”169 According to Gadamer,
an interpreter’s quest to understand what we now refer to as the Inuit
people is thus motivated by her position in time.170 The interpreter’s
160. Id. at 324 (“The judge seeks to be in accord with the ‘legal idea’ in mediating it
with the present. This is, of course, a legal mediation.”); see also ZIMMERMANN, supra note
145, at 47 (emphasis in original) (“For Gadamer, understanding works essentially as
mediation. Mediation is the heart of hermeneutic experience.”) (italics in original).
161. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at xxix (observing that legal
adjudication attempts to arrive at a “ ‘correct’ interpretation, which necessarily includes
the mediation between history and the present in the act of understanding itself.”); see
also GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 147, at 22 (discussing her-
meneutical construction of a “bridge built between the once and the now”).
162. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 158.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 159–60.
165. See Eskridge, supra note 143, at 617:
The implication of [the fact that understanding is being] for Gadamer is that
interpretation is neither the discovery of the text’s intended meaning, nor
the imposition of the interpreter’s views upon the text; rather, interpretation
is the common ground of interaction between text and interpreter, by which
each establishes its being.
166. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 161 (referring to G.W. F. Hegel
with approval).
167. See id.
168. See id. at xxix.
169. Id.
170. See id.
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mediation of the history of the Inuit people thus creates meaning
that is reflective both of the interpreter and of the time in which that
interpreter makes Inuit history meaningful for the interpreter herself
and her own place in time:
In fifty or a hundred years, anyone who reads the history of these
tribes as it is written today will not only find it outdated (for in
the meantime he will know more or interpret the sources more
correctly); he will also be able to see that in the 1960s people
read the sources differently because they were moved by different
questions, prejudices, and interests.171
Meaning is thus both temporally inscribed and circumscribed, and
it is also dependent upon the experiences that the interpreter brings
to bear on the text in her moment of understanding.172 Meaning is
thus indicative of the individual creating meaning. That is, at the
moment of understanding, the interpreter may reveal more about
herself and her time than she might about the text and its own time.173
“Even the restorer or the preserver of ancient monuments,” Gadamer
reminds us, “remains an artist of his time.”174
The interpreter’s situation in time means that she brings to her
mediation particular traditions and prejudices.175 Traditions are the
formative backdrop that infuse, inform, expand and/or limit her un-
derstanding.176 Traditions place the interpreter within a temporal
paradigm that predetermines her hermeneutic posture and they pre-
dispose her to certain prejudgments, fore-understandings, or fore-
conceptions.177 These prejudgments or fore-understandings are the
prejudices that mold her perspective and inflect her interpretation.178
171. Id.; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 79, at 34 (“Today we probably hold some views
that are just as mistaken as [those of the past that we reject], but it is difficult to know
which views these are . . . .”).
172. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 269.
173. See Eskridge, supra note 143, at 622 (“Thus, a critic analyzing Dickens’s David
Copperfield in 1880 will inevitably draw different insights from the novel than would a
critic in 1960.”); see also FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER 125
(Lorraine Code, ed. 2002).
174. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 150.
175. See id. at 272.
176. See id. at 352 (“For tradition is a genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to
it, as does the I with a Thou.”); Mootz, supra note 157, at 144 (“We can never read a text
for the first time, so to speak, because the way in which the text will speak to us is al-
ready shaped by the tradition.”).
177. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 269 (citing Martin Heidegger
for the proposition that “interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by
more suitable ones.”).
178. See id. at 304 (“We started by saying that a hermeneutical situation is determined
by the prejudices that we bring with us.”); GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra
note 147, at 9 (“It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our
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The text to which these prejudgments are brought is in constant ten-
sion with both the traditions that the interpreter brings to bear upon
it and with the particular prejudices that act as a prism through
which the interpreter’s understanding is refracted.179
The existence, nevertheless, of such traditions and prejudices
neither makes the interpreter conservative as a matter of principle
nor does it imply that a hermeneutic approach is antagonistic to
transformative readings in the face of tradition and prejudice.180 In-
stead, the interpreter’s task is to be aware of the pressures exerted
upon her by her traditions and prejudices (indeed, not all of them
nefarious); her task is to bring such pressures to consciousness in
her mediation; and her task is also to reach through and beyond them
so as to engage in an open and potentially transformative conversa-
tion with the otherness against which they might inherently militate
that exist in the text before her.181
For Gadamer, the interpreter is thus already “situated” vis-à-vis
the text.182 That is, her position in time, her particular place in history,
informs the scope of her vision when engaging with the text before
her.183 The contextual or historical situation of the interpreter thus
evokes her particular “horizon,” which is the field of vision that charac-
terizes her space in time, and she might transcend her horizon by
“see[ing] beyond it”:
Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of ‘hori-
zon’. The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything
being. . . . Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions
whereby we experience something—whereby what we encounter says something to us.”)
(citation omitted).
179. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 305 (mentioning the
“tension between the text and the present”); GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS,
supra note 147, at 19 (mentioning the “tension and release that structure all under-
standing and understandability”); id. at 9 (“Prejudices are biases of our openness to the
world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something—whereby what we
encounter says something to us.”).
180. See id. at 32–34 (rejecting Jürgen Habermas’s criticism of Gadamer’s views of
tradition and prejudice as overlooking the possibility of transformative engagements
with authority).
181. See GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 147, at 38 (“[T]he pre-
judgments that lead my preunderstanding are also constantly at stake, right up to the
moment of their surrender—which surrender could also be called a transformation.”);
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 305 (“The hermeneutic task consists
in not covering up this tension [between the text and the present] by attempting a naive
assimilation of the two but in consciously bringing it out.”); Francis J. Mootz III, Nietzsche
and Legal Theory (Part II): Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 968 (2003) (“Philosophical hermeneutics challenges methodological
approaches to interpretation by claiming that genuine understanding is possible only when
the interpreter risks her prejudiced horizon of preunderstanding in dialogic experience.”).
182. See Mootz, supra note 181, at 967–68.
183. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 269.
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that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to
the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possi-
ble expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and
so forth.184
A text, too, has its own horizon, which must be embraced and con-
fronted in the act of understanding.185 The discovery of a text’s horizon
makes its ideas comprehensible to the interpreter even if she does not
agree with their substance.186 By their nature, horizons past and pres-
ent are “always in motion.”187 The interpreter moves into horizons and
they move with her.188 When horizons meet, there is a “fusion of hori-
zons” that “does not entail passing into alien worlds unconnected in
any way with our own; instead, they together constitute the one great
horizon that moves from within and that, beyond the frontiers of the
present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness.”189
In other words, the hermeneutic “horizon” that permanently sur-
rounds and engulfs both interpreter and text is at once limitation and
transcendence, specific and universal, individual and contextual.190
Since mediation between differences is at the basis of the “fusion
of horizons,” the concept of application, Gadamer shows, is inherent
in such a fusion.191 “Application,” the “motivating power, [the herme-
neutic] soul,” is also part of a unified hermeneutic process involving
understanding and interpretation.192 Application in interpretation
brings together past and present, tradition and interpreter, “I and
Thou.”193 Application implies that the text is read by a given individ-
ual within a given hermeneutic context on which, as regards legal
texts in particular, it has concrete bearing.194
184. Id. at 301.
185. See id. at 302 (“If we fail to transpose ourselves into the historical horizon from
which the traditionary text speaks, we will misunderstand the significance of what it has
to say to us.”).
186. Id. at 302.
187. Id. at 303.
188. See id.
189. Id.; see also PALMER, supra note 145, at 244 (“The hermeneutical encounter is not
a denial or negation of one’s own horizon (for one must see through it and can never see
at all without it) but a willingness to risk it in a free opening of oneself.”).
190. These antinomies recall the hermeneutic circle. The idea of a hermeneutic circle
envisions the movement between the part and the whole and vice versa, each dependent
upon the other in the act of understanding. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra
note 144, at 268–78, 293–99.
191. See id. at xxix (“[T]here is mediation between the past and the present: that is,
application.”).
192. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 318–19; ZIMMERMANN, supra
note 145, at 51.
193. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 354.
194. Id. at 316; see also PALMER, supra note 145, at 235–37 (discussing the “Significance
of Application” for the hermeneutic undertaking).
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In application, the legal interpreter thus engages with the text
in a “new and different way” and applies it to her chosen context.195
The hermeneutic task of application, nevertheless, presents prob-
lems for any interpreter for she cannot apply what she does not
possess.196 Her engagement with the text—her ability to apply as
regards that text—is necessarily constrained or enlarged by her
inherent ability, itself circumscribed within a particular tradition
and its prejudices.197 She thus applies and understands herself while
interpreting the text before her.198 As regards legal texts in particular,
“[t]he work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific
case—i.e., it is a work of application.”199 In other words, hermeneutic
application in the legal context has both individual and broader
dimensions to which the legal interpreter must be responsive.200
Does this mean that “truth” is irrelevant and Gadamer leaves
us with nothing but a cacophonous world of subjective voices com-
peting for dominance? Far from it. Under Gadamer’s insights, “when
we say we understand, we are laying claim to truth.”201 Understand-
ing, however, is not a benign undertaking that embeds each inter-
preter further in the refuge of the familiar.202 Gadamer underscores
that conversation or dialog is a means of exposing individual preju-
dices and traditions to the challenge of others, which might thereby
allow both sets of traditions and prejudices to transcend their con-
textual confines and approximate truth, if not truth itself.203
Conversation thus requires the individual to transcend the limits
of the particular and touch the universal by upholding, modifying, or
abandoning the familiar refuges within which the particular might
easily claim refuge.204 Hermeneutics exposes what lies behind, what
is before, and it concerns itself with fore-understanding, pre-under-
standing, pre-judgment, ant[e]-cipations, and the un-said, as these are
all conditions of understanding that might undermine understanding
195. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 307–08.
196. Id. at 313. In some sense, what she already possesses informs her hermeneutic
posture. See GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 147, at 9 (“Rather,
we are possessed by something and precisely by means of it we are opened up for the
new, the different, the true.”).
197. See id. at 21 (“[The art of understanding] is a skill in which one gifted person may
surpass all others, and theory can at best only tell us why.”); id. at 9 (“It is not so much
our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being.”).
198. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, GADAMER IN CONVERSATION: REFLECTIONS AND
COMMENTARY 37–38 (Richard E. Palmer, ed. & trans. 2001) [hereinafter GADAMER,
REFLECTIONS].
199. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 325.
200. See id. at 316.
201. JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 141 (1994).
202. See Eskridge, supra note 143, at 623.
203. See id. at 612–13.
204. See id. at 623.
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and the conversation to which it aspires.205 As Gadamer puts it, “[w]e
do not need just to hear one another but to listen to one another. Only
when this happens is there understanding.”206 In other words, con-
versation (and the truth it might generate) are participatory exer-
cises in which openness and transparency are sought and shared.207
Hermeneutics “remains continually ready to alter its opinion when
better insight comes along.”208
C. Gadamer’s Interpreters
Both courts and commentators have cited to Gadamer.209 Before
providing a brief overview of the commentators explicitly engaging
with Gadamer (as so many implicitly rely on his insights), I offer first
a summary of the court cases citing to his work. I conclude with a dis-
cussion of how my Article engages with Gadamer’s legal commenta-
tors and why it is important to rely on Gadamer’s work at this moment
in time.
Courts have cited to Gadamer with approval.210 They have taken
for granted his theories of interpretation and have appreciated his
insight regarding understanding as an alternative to scientific
positivism.211 They have cited to Gadamer at some length for his
understanding of interpretation when they interpret the federal con-
stitution.212 They have referred to Gadamer when noting that “suc-
cessful communication depends on meanings shared by interpretive
communities.”213 Thus, for judges Gadamer’s arguments regarding
interpretation and understanding have particular force and are
worthy of citation.214
More significantly, Gadamer’s work has generated an extensive
legal commentary since the appearance of Truth and Method in
205. See GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 147, at 67, 88–94, 117,
121.
206. GADAMER, REFLECTIONS, supra note 198, at 39.
207. See id. at 40 (“I have suggested that the ideal of objective knowledge which domi-
nates our concepts of knowledge, science, and truth needs to be supplemented by the ideal
of sharing in something, of participation.”); GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note
144, at 271 (“All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person
or text.”).
208. GRONDIN, supra note 201, at 113.
209. See, e.g., Continental Can Co. V. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse
Workers Union Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990); Mercado v. Ahmed,
756 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Doe v. Daily News, L.P., 660 N.Y.S. 2d 604,
607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
210. See, e.g., Continental Can Co., 916 F.2d at 1157.
211. See Mercado, 756 F. Supp. at 1099 n.2 (noting also Gadamer’s “high regard for legal
interpretation may explain the high regard in which he is held by some legal interpreters”).
212. See, e.g., Daily News, L.P., 660 N.Y.S. 2d at 604.
213. Continental Can Co., 916 F.2d at 1157.
214. See, e.g., id.; Daily News, L.P., 660 N.Y.S. 2d at 607.
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1960.215 Recent legal commentators have cited to Gadamer for his
challenge to “pure rationality,” and they have also extended the ap-
plication of his insights to constitutional law, contract law, copyright
law, environmental law, evidence law, human rights law, immigra-
tion law, international law, patent law, and statutory interpreta-
tion, among others.216 They have derived from Gadamer a “critical
215. Given that a search for “Gadamer” returns 1,101 responsive articles on LexisNexis,
I cite selectively to that literature in this Article. See LEXISNEXIS ADVANCE, https://ad
vance.lexis.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). I also set aside the philosophical disagreements
with Gadamer by Emilio Betti, Jacques Derrida, Ronald Dworkin, Jürgen Habermas, E.D.
Hirsch, and Paul Ricoeur, among many others, which are taken up in detail in many of the
sources to which I cite. For Betti, see, for example, ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 133;
Eskridge, supra note 143, at 624. For Derrida, see, for example, ZIMMERMANN, supra note
145, at 48; Eskridge, supra note 143, at 627; Mootz, supra note 157, at 157 & 172. For
Dworkin, see, for example, Eskridge, supra note 143, at 646; Allan C. Hutchinson, Herme-
neutics and Critique in Legal Practice—Work in Progress: Gadamer, Tradition and the
Common Law, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2000). For Habermas, see, for example,
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 134; Fred R. Dallmayr, Borders or Horizons? Gadamer
and Habermas Revisited, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 826 (2000); Mootz, supra note 181, at
971. For Hirsch, see, for example, ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 60; Eskridge, supra note
143, at 624. For Ricoeur, see, for example, ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 62–63;
Eskridge, supra note 143, at 632; Mootz, supra note 143, at 597. I also set aside discus-
sion of Gadamer’s application to the humanities and religion. For a very brief overview,
see ZIMMERMANN, supra note 145, at 57–98.
216. For “pure rationality,” see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why We Can’t “Just All Get
Along”: Dysfunction in the Polity and Conflict Resolution and What We Might Do About It,
2018 J. DISP. RESOL. 5, 8–9 n.20 (2018). For constitutional law, see, for example, Eskridge,
supra note 143, at 609, 614 (gay rights); Mootz, supra note 181, at 968 (same); Mootz, supra
note 143 (death penalty, race); Mootz, supra note 157 (abortion); Francis J. Mootz III, Law
in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition,
11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 312 (1999) [hereinafter Mootz, Natural Law] (affirmative ac-
tion, assisted suicide); Shlomo C. Pill, Valuing Our Constitutional Discourse: Autonomous-
Text Constitutionalism and the Jewish Legal Tradition, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 350 (2016)
(constitutional interpretation generally); Mark E. Brandon, Originalism and Purpose:
A Précis, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 413, 424 (2013) (same); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism
and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1964 (2013) (same). For contract
law, see, for example, Shahar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic Perspective on
the Interpretation of Contracts, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 519, 541 (2017). For copyright law, see, for
example, Omri Rachum-Twaig, A Genre Theory of Copyright, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 34, 43 n.17 (2017); Lior Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, 95 OR. L. REV. 141, 172 n.146
(2017). For environmental law, see, for example, Edward L. Rubin, Rejecting Climate
Change: Not Science Denial But Regulation Phobia, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 5 n.16
(2016). For evidence law, see, for example, Jennifer L. Mnookin, Atomism, Holism, and
the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1524, 1536 n.27 (2013). For inter-
national law, see, for example, Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Signifi-
cance and Problems for a Critical View, 27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 215, 230 (2013). For
human rights law, see, for example, Bernard K. Freamon, ISIS, Boko Haram, and the
Human Right to Freedom from Slavery Under Islamic Law, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 245,
274 n.70 (2015); Samuel Moyn, The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity, 17 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 39, 64 n.76 (2014). For immigration law, see, for example, Eskridge,
supra note 143. For patent law, see, for example, Huang Yan, A Dynamic Framework for
Patent Claim Construction: Insights from a Philosophical Hermeneutic Study, 21 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 19 (2013). For statutory interpretation, see, for example, Eskridge,
supra note 143; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
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legal hermeneutics” that puts the interpreter’s own traditions and
prejudices at risk.217 They have shown the transformative power of
Gadamer’s dialogic emphasis for legal analysis, and they have ex-
tended even further the reach of his work by supplementing it with
the work of other philosophers and thinkers in the service of justice.218
Commentators have also identified openness as a key political virtue
in Gadamer’s thought.219 In sum, as commentators have underscored
the centrality of a Gadamerian approach to the practical issues posed
by legal cases, commentators have displayed the appealing depth
and breadth of Gadamer’s importance for lawyers.220
To the extent that it extends Gadamer’s reach to a different area
of American law while building on the work of previous commenta-
tors, my argument is consistent with these approaches. By applying
Gadamer’s work to an area of American law to which it has not al-
ready been applied (remedies law), my work underscores Gadamer’s
universal appeal.221 Similarly, my project shows that Gadamer’s work
has powerful social justice and civil rights reverberations beyond
those already identified by other commentators (that is beyond the
important and often controversial areas of abortion, assisted suicide,
capital punishment, gay rights, and race, among others).222 Here, I
apply Gadamer to sexism/misogyny and religious intolerance. My
work thus draws from the interpretive work that precedes it and
pursues its social justice impetus in other areas of the law.
217. See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 157, at 76 et seq.; Mootz, supra note 181, at 1017 et
seq.; GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION 137, 160–64 (1992).
218. On Gadamer’s advancing the ends of justice by questioning tradition, see generally
GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION AND REASON (1987). On the dia-
logic aspect of Gadamer’s work, see, for example, Eskridge, supra note 143, at 613; Mootz,
supra note 145, at 501–14; Mootz, supra note 181, at 971 et seq. On reading other philos-
ophers and thinkers as consistent with Gadamer, see, for example, Mootz, supra note 145,
at 493 et seq. (Chaim Perelman); Mootz, supra note 181 (Nietzsche and Perelman);
WARNKE, supra note 217, at 129–31 (Ronald Dworkin and Alasdair MacIntyre); Steven
Paul Cauchon, Openness to Critical Reflection: Gandhi beyond Gadamer, in INHERITING
GADAMER: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 102–20 (Georgia Warnke
ed., 2016).
219. On openness in Gadamer, see Whitney Mannies, Elements of Style: Openness and
Dispositions, in INHERITING GADAMER: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEU-
TICS 81–101.
220. Supra note 216 and accompanying text.
221. Legal commentators have also criticized Gadamer on a number of bases. See, e.g.,
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court: 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 n.11 (1983) (Gadamer is “disappointingly provincial”); Robin L. West, Are
There Nothing but Texts in This Class? Interpreting the Interpretive Turns in Legal
Thought, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1125 (2000) (Gadamer conflates moral and interpretive
capacities, overridingly focuses on the human condition as essentially interpretive to the
detriment of other approaches when in fact interpretation is a choice and is not intrinsically
inevitable, and his work lacks social criticism).
222. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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Since my horizon differs from that of other interpreters, my work
is, more importantly, a departure from that which precedes it.223 As
with the remedies literature, I have found no commentator that has
examined the importance of moral outrage in the literature on
Gadamer.224 As is the case in remedies literature, there are tantaliz-
ing references to outrage in the literature on Gadamer but no sus-
tained treatment of the subject.225 My work thus introduces moral
outrage both to remedies law and to the literature on Gadamer and
it argues that judges should express moral outrage in their opinions.
Some might object to the normative dimension of my engagement
with Gadamer. They might say that Gadamer is descriptive rather
than normative, and that he explicitly abjures the deployment of a
particular methodology in the service of truth, which I am doing by
telling courts what to do when faced with individuals from commu-
nities at risk.226 In support of their argument, they might rely on
other interpreters of Gadamer, many of whom I have cited above, who
read Gadamer with other thinkers so as to provide normative impe-
tus to Gadamer’s insights.227 Theirs, however, is one interpretation
of Gadamer. Mine is another, and it is supported by other readings
of Gadamer.228
Relying on Gadamer’s focus on openness, my Article focuses on
the context surrounding a judicial trial at a particular moment in
time as part of the relevant horizon to which a judge must attend in
her adjudication of a case.229 Under my reading of Gadamer, a judge
223. See Hassan El Menyawi, Same Sex Marriage in Islamic Law, 2 WAKE FOREST J.
L. & POL’Y 375, 410 (2012).
224. See infra note 225.
225. Of course, this is not to say that the word “outrage” does not appear in the literature
referring to Gadamer; it does. It is instead to say that “outrage” appears as one word
among many in the Article and is not the hermeneutic concern of the Article. See, e.g.,
Paul C. Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157,
157 (1980); Mark Kingwell, Let’s Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature, YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
317, 351 (1994); R. Shep Melnick, Statutory Reconstruction: The Politics of Eskridge’s
Interpretation, 84 GEO. L.J. 108, 108, 121 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994); Mootz, supra note 143, at 614; Emmanuel
Voyiakis, International Law, Interpretative Fidelity, and the Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg
Gadamer, 4 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 385, 388 (2011).
226. Cauchon, supra note 218.
227. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 143, at 629 (“Most of Truth and Method sounds
descriptive (this is what interpretation essentially is), but there is an element of choice
and normative prescription in Gadamer’s advice”); Mootz, Natural Law, supra note 216,
at 319 (“Gadamer concludes that ‘putting at risk’ is the guiding normative implication of
his philosophy, emphasizing that ‘hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an
absolute position but as a way of experience. It insists that there is no higher principle
than holding oneself open in a conversation.’ ”).
229. See Eskridge, supra note 143, at 620 (“Horizon is context, ‘the range of vision that
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.’ Our vision might
be focused on one thing, but we also have a field of vision, a horizon, that conditions what
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must both explicitly take into consideration her own particular horizon
and the context surrounding a trial at a given point in time (the
judge’s and the case’s horizons).230 In doing so, the judge must ac-
count for the bearing of the case’s horizon on the parties to the case
before her and she must also consider that horizon in her opinion in
an overt manner in the service of social justice as she places her own
traditions and prejudices at risk.231
The judge is encouraged to draw on a wide range of contemporary
sources, including newspapers, journals, and other secondary mate-
rials, which will provide the basis for her opinion that will express
moral outrage in a given instance at a particular point in time be-
cause it is necessary. Such a requirement of reliance on a wide source
materials is hardly a departure from what judges already do and it
is hardly a departure from the horizon that they already bring to
cases each day since they are immersed in a culture awash with such
materials.232 Thus, “horizon” remains central to my reading as it is
to Gadamer’s.233
Why Gadamer? Why now? Outrage is not only a fixture of the
current American and global horizons, but it is also a compelling way
to address ongoing problems such as sexism/misogyny and religious
intolerance, which are the concern of this Article.234 Current public
discourse in the United States—in which American judges, jurors,
and litigants are steeped and to which they all contribute—is rife
with references to the traditions and prejudices that both bind and
rend us.235 Gadamer’s work is about the place of such traditions and
we see when we focus.”); William M. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 319, 346 (1989) (“Every text has a context (horizon) of assumptions the author
makes about the world around her. The interpreter also has a context (horizon), but one
that is different from the text’s, because the world has changed and the interpreter is a
different person from the author.”); Menyawi, supra note 223 (“Every person brings their
own horizon, or context, to a text. This is linked to Gadamer’s idea of the ‘history of effect’
that historically situates a person’s understanding.”).
230. See Eskridge, supra note 143.
231. Taking the context—and the state in which the particular plaintiff’s horizon
arises—into consideration is hinted at the trial court level in Ms. Elauf’s case. See
Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 (“Elauf has, since age 13, worn the head scarf con-
sistently and continuously when in public or in the presence of men who are strangers—
this despite the fact that she resides in Tulsa, Oklahoma”).
232. Definition of Admissible Evidence, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/admissible_evidence [https://perma.cc/C84P
-B5QS] (providing definition of admissible evidence is broad).
233. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 313.
234. It is important to state that while I focus on the issues directly raised by Sheridan,
Abercrombie and other cases: sexism/misogyny and islamophobia/religious intolerance
this is not to say that these are the only issues bedeviling American public and political
discourse. It is to say, however, that these issues are indicative both of the kinds of chal-
lenges facing American litigants and judges and of the kinds of cases in which outrage
should be expressed under my approach.
235. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (U.S. 2015) (“The right to
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prejudices in our lives in this particular moment as we engage with
a difficult and often impenetrable past and about openly confronting
and transcending them.236 Discussions regarding women in America,
Muslims in America and religious intolerance in general (to name
only a few) have become even more central to American public dis-
course in both troubling and novel ways.237 Women and minority
religious communities have long been under sustained attack (again,
among so many others to which I refer below).238 We need a Gadamer-
ian approach in this moment given its liberating dialogic effect for
vulnerable constituencies and communities. In sum, this is why
Gadamer and why now.
III. MEANINGS OF MORAL OUTRAGE
But first, what is moral outrage, what does it do, and why should
we have it in judicial opinions? To respond to this question, I return
to the Sheridan case, the rags-to-riches-to-rags oil-skimming story
with which I opened my discussion.239 In that case, recall that on the
marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from an-
cient sources alone.”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (U.S. 2013) (“The
House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a
moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality.’ ”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia & Thomas,
JJ., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-
profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which
I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”); Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 700 (2000) (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(“As Justice Brandeis so wisely advised, ‘we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles.’ ”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,
Rehnquist & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (“The constitutional amendment before us here . . .
is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual
mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through
use of the laws.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (“Against this background,
to claim that a right to engage in [homosexual] conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”).
236. See supra Part II.
237. See Women’s Rights, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/womens-rights#current
[https://perma.cc/F4TM-C3E4] (see current issues facing women); Shadi Hamid, For Reli-
gious American Muslims, Hostility from the Right and Disdain from the Left, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos
/2019/08/05/for-religious-american-muslims-hostility-from-the-right-and-disdain-from
-the-left/ [https://perma.cc/2E56-RFFT].
238. See Roe v. Wade Turns 40, but the Debate is Even Older, NPR (Jan. 22, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/01/22/169637288/roe-v-wade-turns-40-but
-abortion-debate-is-even-older [https://perma.cc/WD4E-DEUK] (as an example, the abortion
debate started at least as far back as the 1950s); Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History
of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 2010), https://www.smithsonianmag
.com/history/americas-true-history-of-religious-tolerance-61312684/ [https://perma.cc
/7G6F-S75J].
239. See supra Introduction.
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basis of public morality, conscience, and public policy the court was
outraged at the Sheridans.240 The court also reported the Sheridan
couple to the relevant authorities for failing to report their illicit in-
come for tax purposes.241 “We do not reward wrongdoers!” the appalled
court wrote.242 The court also balked at the fact that Mr. Sheridan
“just did not bother to get a job!”243It awarded Mrs. Sheridan alimony,
child support, and attorneys’ fees.244 Here, I identify the vocal aspect
of outrage, its Gadamerian “fusions of horizons,” and its dignitary as-
pect as constitutive parts of outrage’s importance in this moment.245
A. Outrage as Vociferation
Moral outrage is judicial vociferation of its disapproval regard-
ing a particular infraction at a given point in time.246 In engaging
with the litigants’ arguments, the Sheridan court referred both to
the equitable nature of the remedy sought and it referred to public
morality.247 “As the ultimate repository,” the Sheridan court stated,
“the gatekeeper of that conscience and morality, equity’s forum can
never be used to promote or condone crime or clearly defined
breaches of public morality.”248 The court observed that “[t]he morality
of which equity speaks is that of society and not the judge’s personal
view of right and wrong.”249 Suzanne and Charles Sheridan’s mar-
riage contract and the legal arguments that they advanced were
only enforceable to the extent that they were compatible “with the
laws or public policies of the state.”250 In other words, the remedy
the Sheridan couple sought was moral in nature, which meant that
the judicial response to their request for a remedy could be vocalized
in writing freighted with the appropriate moral disapproval of their
objectionable conduct at that moment in time in 1990.251
There was something Gadamerian about the Sheridan courts’
approach to the equitable division of marital assets (and the accom-
panying outrage that the court voiced).252 Indeed, the court need not
have approached the issues before it in the outraged manner in which
240. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1070–71, 1075 (N.J. Super Ct. 1990).
241. Id. at 1072–74.
242. Id. at 1071.
243. Id. at 1075.
244. Id. at 1076–77.
245. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 144, at 301.
246. See generally supra Section I.C.
247. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1070.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. On the morality of an equitable remedy, see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
252. See generally Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067.
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it did, but for some reason it felt compelled to do so. Cases citing to
Sheridan, some of which also mention morality and equity, make this
point clear when they do not express moral outrage.253 Sheridan’s
distinctive—and some might say “quaint”—reliance on equity’s con-
science to express moral outrage is more likely to find analogs in opin-
ions from before the passage of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934 than
after.254 Writing in 1990, like the Sheridan court does in a memorable
manner about equity’s “conscience”—and referring to that conscience
a number of times in the same opinion—is, therefore, saying some-
thing about the meeting of the Sheridan judge’s particular horizon
and of that case’s horizon, which gave rise to the judge’s iconoclastic
vociferation of moral outrage in the case.255
B. Outrage as “Fusion of Horizons”
To make clear the importance of a particular judge’s and case’s
horizons in remedies cases, we need only consider the following facts
from a Vermont property case. Roland and Leita Pion sued for an
equitable remedy to resolve a boundary dispute regarding land that
had once belonged to Mrs. Pion’s grandfather.256 At trial, Mrs. Pion
admitted that she had forced “4 or 5” people off the land that the de-
fendants now owned.257 She had threatened a previous neighbor with
a firearm and had called him “cripple.”258 She had struck another’s dog
with a broom, had called that particular neighbor a “fucking crazy
bitch” and had told the neighbor’s children that “that their Mommy
253. See, e.g., Monmouth Cty. Div. of Social Services on Behalf of Div. of Youth and Fam-
ily Services v. C.R., 720 A.2d 1004, 1014 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (quoting Sheridan’s
discussion of morality and conscience); Hoefers v. Jones, 672 A.2d 1299, 307 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1994) (citing to Sheridan for the proposition that “[a] Court of Equity, as a Court
of Conscience, cannot be used as a forum to advance or condone wrongdoing “); Nakahara
v. NS 1991 Am. Trust, 718 A.2d 518, 523 n.35 (Del. Ch. 1998) (citing to Sheridan’s discus-
sion of unclean hands); Breisch v. Rafanello, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 600, at *8
(N. J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2014) (relying on Sheridan to find that “the judge did not
abuse his discretion in failing to find that plaintiff came to court with unclean hands when
no reimbursement was due “).
254. See, e.g., Richardson v. Bristol Land & Improv. Co., 1 Tenn. App. 671, 684 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1926) (“A court of conscience cannot be compelled by any rules of law to outrage
its conscience in the exercise of any supposed jurisdiction, otherwise it would cease to
be a court of conscience.”); see also DENNIS R. KLINCK, CONSCIENCE, EQUITY, AND THE
COURT OF CHANCERY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (2010).
255. Indeed, reliance on equity and its conscience characterizes nineteenth century
remedies cases. See Duane Rudolph, How Equity and Custom Transformed American
Waste Law, 2 PROP. L. J. 1, 6 (2015).
256. Pion v. Bean, No. S348-00 Fc, slip op. at 11 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2002).
257. Id. at 9 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2002); see also Brief for Appellants at 25–27, Pion v.
Bean, 833 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Vt. 2003) (No. 2002-179) (acknowledging that “[a]ll of the
behavior which Mrs. Pion is accused of took place when the appellees were out of doors,
within view of the public; she never entered their home or confronted them anywhere
but outside”).
258. Pion, No. S348-00 Fc, slip op. at 5.
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and Daddy were going to hurt them.”259 Mrs. Pion had repeatedly
called the police to lodge false complaints about another neighbor
whom she had called a “hag,” a “witch,” and a “fucking bitch.”260
As a result of Mrs. Pion’s conduct, the next round of neighbors
tried to sell their home for half a year.261 So they would not purchase
the property, Mrs. Pion shouted at prospective buyers, which forced
her neighbors to abandon their home to a state agency.262 As they
moved out, “Mrs. Pion stood outside their home and smiled.”263 Mrs.
Pion was not done. She moved boundary markers on the defendants’
land, put up chain link fences on their property, filled in their neigh-
bor’s stream bed resulting in a flooded basement, felled their trees and
hurled obscenities at them, too.264 She called the defendant’s sister-in-
law “a ‘slut’ and a ‘whore.’ ”265 Because the actual malice element had
been met in the case, punitive damages were issued, but neither the
trial, appellate, nor the Supreme Court of Vermont in the Pion case ex-
pressed any palpable outrage—certainly none of the Sheridan kind.266
By relying on remedial morality of the Sheridan kind when faced
with facts more egregious and shocking than those in Sheridan, the
Pion courts could have expressed moral outrage.267 The Pion courts
could have expressed such outrage, for example, when upholding an
equitable injunction against the Pions for their misconduct.268 Simi-
larly, Kansas—an opinion about the correct remedy when faced with
continued willful misconduct in a water rights case—could also have
expressed moral outrage, especially since it was a decision, much like
Sheridan (non-payment of taxes), about offenses against a governmen-
tal entity in matters involving money.269 The Supreme Court of
Vermont, which decided Pion in 2003, could have founded its ex-
pression of moral outrage against the Pions on a remedial con-
science since the court had already referred to a remedial conscience
in the years before Pion and it continues repeatedly to do so after-
ward.270 Kansas could also have done the same thing since justices
259. Id. at 6.
260. Id. at 7.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Pion, No. S348-00 Fc, slip op. at 7.
264. Id. at 9.
265. Id.
266. Pion v. Bean, 833 A.2d 1248, 1252 (Vt. 2003).
267. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Sup. Ct. N.J. Ch. Div. 1990).
268. Id.
269. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1057.
270. See, e.g., State v. Putnam, 130 A.3d 836, 852–53 (Vt. 2015); Darling v. Crow, 2015
Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 92, *7 (2015); Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc., 95 A.3d 447, 454 (Vt.
2014); Bandler v. Majestic Car Rental Group, Inc., 2013 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 256, at *7
(2013); Kellogg v. Shushereba, 82 A.3d 1121, 1138 (Vt. 2013); Shattuck v. Peck, 70 A.3d
922, 934–35 (Vt. 2013); Marsh v. McGillvray, 67 A.3d 943, 956–57 (Vt. 2012); Mueller v.
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of the Supreme Court of the United States had also referred to equity’s
conscience before Kansas and have done so in more recent opin-
ions.271 Neither of them did, however.
While the Supreme Court of Vermont qualified the Pions’ acts as
“egregious” and affirmed the trial court’s finding of a “vicious disregard
and disrespect for the defendants’ personal and property rights,” it did
not pay any attention to what Todd Rakoff has called the “social mean-
ings” of the alleged objectionable conduct.272 Judicial responsiveness
to the social meanings of phrases in Pion such as “fucking crazy
bitch”, “slut”, “whore”, “hag,” “witch,” and “fucking bitch” would see
such damaging language as part of a continuum of the centuries-old
subordination of women, even where other women were involved in
the demeaning of women. Attention to social meanings would explic-
itly condemn such misconduct as part of the award for punitive
damages, for example, or it might elicit written disapproval of such
misconduct from the bench as part of the opinion. True, Pion is, more
than anything else, a property rights case about obnoxious neigh-
bors.273 However, what makes the neighbors obnoxious also makes
them outrageous in legally significant ways, which is sanctionable
under current law and should be subject to an outrage remedy.274
In some sense then, the fusion of a particular court’s horizon
and a particular case’s horizon can foment or suppress an expression
of moral outrage in that case. Different courts have different under-
standings of facts and different responses regarding the necessity of
moral outrage. Although Sheridan and Pion were decided by very dif-
ferent courts, the cases are similar in that both cases involved what
Henry Smith would refer to as opportunistic litigants trying to use
the courts to sanitize their egregious misconduct.275 The Sheridans
Mueller, 54 A.3d 168, 176–77 (Vt. 2012); Savage v. Walker, 969 A.2d 121, 121 (Vt. 2009);
Montgomery v. Cheshire Handling, 2009 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 158, at * 13 (2009); Weed v.
Weed, 968 A.2d 310, 315 (Vt. 2009); Johnson v. Harwood, 945 A.2d 875, 881–82 (Vt. 2008);
Clark v. Witte, 182 Vt. 650, 650 (Vt. 2007); Korda v. Chi. Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 1018, 1028 (Vt.
2006); Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 489 A.2d 942, 954–55 (Vt. 2005); Monahan v. GMAC
Mortg. Corp., 893 A.2d 298, 217 (Vt. 2005); Mann v. Levin, 861 A.2d 1138, 1147 (Vt.
2004); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gamelin, 786 A.2d 1078, 1088 (Vt. 2001).
271. See, e.g., Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2536, 2548 (2018) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1260 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring); Holland
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 670 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Phillipines v. Pimentel, 553
U.S. 851, 862 (2008).
272. Pion v. Bean, 833 A.2d 1248, 1259 (Vt. 2003); see Rakoff, supra note 86, at 83–94.
To be sure, Rakoff focuses on official actions subject to constitutional review, but his point
is a hermeneutic one. That is, context matters, and actions—including speech acts—are
embedded within an expansive context that defines their contours and bearing. As Rakoff
notes, “making social meaning the direct subject of legal inquiry will indeed make officials
more careful to avoid creating invidious meanings.” Id. at 92.
273. Pion, 833 A.2d at 1251.
274. Klass, supra note 96, at 90.
275. On opportunism, see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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sued to divide illegal money and the Pions sued to destroy their neigh-
bors.276 Yet, only Sheridan expressed moral outrage—and for failure
to pay taxes while requesting a judicial remedy.277 The horizons that
individual judges bring to each case and the horizons that they con-
front at given points in time thus matter and they have some bearing
on expressions of moral outrage.
What kind of horizon might an individual judge bring to a case?
Sheridan’s indignation at failure to pay taxes while requesting a re-
medy may have something to do with the litigants’ implicit attack
on the institution of marriage, whose upholding may be central to the
judge’s own particular horizon, traditions and prejudices.278 Sheridan
notes, for example, that “marriage in terms both human and material
is afforded great deference and many societal protections.”279 It is “a
social relationship subject in all respects to the state’s police power.”280
Marriage “creat[es] the most important relation in life.”281 Concerns
about marriage may motivate the displacement of moral outrage
from the dissolution of marriage (which is legally acceptable) to the
failure to pay taxes while requesting a remedy (which is legally un-
acceptable).282 Outrage can thus be a response to a perceived attack
on particular traditions and prejudices to which a particular judge
is attentive.
Pion, in particular, presented courts with numerous opportuni-
ties to express moral outrage, which were eschewed.283 Almost eight
months before the Supreme Court of Vermont handed down Pion,
a lower Vermont court had found the Pions in contempt and had
fined them:
[T]he state court found that the Pions had violated Judgment 1
(entered March 11, 2002), held the Pions in contempt, and ordered
them to pay a $1,000 sanction to the Beans for violating that
order. As a specific rationale for finding contempt, Judgment 2
cited a paragraph from Judgment 1 that ordered the Pions to
cease their harassment of the Beans, and forbade the Pions from
surveilling the Beans’ property by way of taking photographs or
using binoculars.284
276. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990); Pion,
833 A.2d at 1251.
277. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1068.
278. Id. at 1069–70.
279. Id. at 1070.
280. Id.
281. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)).
282. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1068.
283. Pion v. Bean, 833 A.2d 1248, 1260 (Vt. 2003).
284. Bean v. Pion (In re Pion), No. 06-10538, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3578, at *32 (Bankr.
D. Vt. Oct. 22, 2007).
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Even after the Supreme Court of Vermont opinion, the Pion case
proved interminable. The Pions disputed (and lost) their appeal of
an award of construction costs for replacement of the defendants’
stone wall.285 The Pions ignored court orders.286 They unsuccessfully
sought to discharge the contempt, punitive, and compensatory dam-
ages against them in a bankruptcy proceeding.287 Again, this fact
validates Gadamer’s insight that particular traditions, prejudices,
and fore-understandings are at play, even in judicial interpretation,
and failure to account for them does not stop them from driving the
outcome of a given case.
C. Outrage as Dignity
From a dignitarian perspective, moral outrage identifies con-
duct that is difficult to understand and accept because it violates the
inherent human dignity of the individual being targeted.288 Inherent
human dignity, as David Luban has powerfully argued, applies to
everyone, no matter who they are and no matter our personal mis-
givings about them:
Once we accept that human dignity requires litigants to be heard,
the justification of the advocate becomes clear. People may be poor
public speakers. They may be inarticulate, unlettered, mentally
disorganized, or just plain stupid. They may know nothing of the
law, and so be unable to argue its interpretation. Knowing no law,
they may omit the very facts that make their case, or focus on
pieces of the story that are irrelevant or prejudicial. They may
be unable to utilize basic procedural rights such as objecting to
their adversary’s leading questions. Their voices may be nails on
a chalkboard or too mumbled to understand. They may speak a
dialect, or for that matter know no English. None of this should
matter. Human dignity does not depend on whether one is stupid
or smooth. Hence the need for the advocate. Just as a non-English
speaker must be provided an interpreter, the legally mute should
have—in the very finest sense of the term—a mouthpiece.289
285. Pion v. Bean, No. 2005-054, 2005 WL 6152658, at *2 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 2005) (affirming
award of construction costs); Pion v. Bean, No. S348-00 Fc, 2004 WL 5459782, at *3 (Vt.
Super. Ct. 2004) (awarding construction costs for replacement of stone wall to defendants).
286. Pion, 2005 WL 6152658, at *1 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 2005) (“The trial court’s final judgment
included several specific orders to address the property damage plaintiffs caused. The
court issued the specific orders because plaintiffs had not followed its previous orders to
make repairs during the pendency of the case.”).
287. Bean v. Pion (In re Pion), No. 06-10538, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3578, at *20–36
(Bankr. D. Vt. Oct. 22, 2007).
288. Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism, supra note 17, at 211.
289. Luban, Lawyers as Upholders, supra note 17, at 819.
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As Luban’s insight implies (and applies within the context of moral
outrage), dignity does two things for moral outrage.290 First, it implies
that certain actions are inimical to inherent human dignity because
those actions humiliate a given individual, usually on the basis of
the individual’s perceived belonging to a class or community that is
deemed inferior and worthy of debasement.291 Second, Luban’s insight
implies that outrage, which is something fundamentally vocal, vocal-
ized, vociferous, can be aligned with the necessity to be heard in a
given situation and that the court in such a case acts, to use Luban’s
word, as the targeted community or class’s “mouthpiece.”292 Outrage
speaks and it also purports to speak on behalf of.293 Outrage under-
scores the failure of conversation, the breakdown of dialogic open-
ness to the other, and it heightens the necessity of unusually vocal
speech so that the other’s plight might be heard and the parties
might come to some understanding of the truth of the situation.294
But isn’t outrage always late? Doesn’t it always arise after the
objectionable act has happened? And if outrage is effective, then
why does its mere expression not foment the desired change once
and for all? Even if late, outrage still holds the perpetrator account-
able and it orders her participation at the dialogic exchange that she
has long rejected by raising the tone of the discussion, which ap-
pears to be the only way she will bring herself to understand at this
moment in time. In this sense, outrage involves a measure of “re-
sentment,” which is about “the unremitting denunciation of injus-
tice.”295 Resentment—
stands for a refusal to ‘normalise’ the crime, to make it part of
the ordinary/explicable/accountable flow of things, to integrate
it into a consistent and meaningful life-narrative; after all possi-
ble explanations, it returns with its question: ‘Yes, I got all this,
but nevertheless, how could you have done it? Your story about
it doesn’t make sense!’296
Outrage thus speaks to a failure of understanding, and it recalls the
horror of the occurrence of those facts in this moment and why they
290. Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism, supra note 17, at 211.
291. Luban, Lawyers as Upholders, supra note 17, at 822.
292. Id. at 830.
293. Bandes, supra note 79, at 368.
294. Id.
295. SLAVOJ æ,æ(., VIOLENCE,DGDSWIRUP\SXUSRVHVæLçHN·VGLVFXVVLRQ
RI´UHVHQWPHQWµLQKLVZRUNRQYLROHQFH:KLOHæLçHNGRHVEULHIO\GLVFXVVPRUDORXWUDJH
in his treatment of “left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence,” his work is not
explicitly about moral outrage, but about systemic and other forms of violence. Id. at 6.
296. Id.
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are inimical to the dignitarian society to which we aspire at this
point in time.297 Finally, outrage can and does bring about change.
Some discriminatory acts, however, are so ingrained and embedded
in our judicial and social structures that they take longer to dislodge
than others—hence, more outrage is necessary to do so.
Outrage, nevertheless, can be unhelpful in some cases. Outrage
can function as a smokescreen. That is, outrage can churn up a cloud
of smoke that prevents people from seeing what the outraged person
is doing behind the veil of smoke.298 Take, for example, Sheridan’s
indignation over a request for a remedy following a failure to pay
taxes.299 The real outrage in that case might be the court’s displaced
displeasure over the dissolution of a marriage, which it hides behind
failure to pay taxes. Or, let’s assume, arguendo, that in the water
rights case Kansas sued Nebraska not because Kansas was out-
raged over Nebraska’s willful breach of its water rights (resulting in
a $3.7 million loss) but because Kansas realized that Nebraska had
long enjoyed the enviable position of having 49% of the Basin’s
water rights (nine percent more than Kansas) and the only way to
get Nebraska back to the negotiation table was to sue Nebraska
promptly and often in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Outrage is thus not self-justifying and is not always proof that the
target of the outrage has done something outrageous.
Outrage can also displace attention. It can effortlessly redirect
its audiences to a tangential or non-issue (a sideshow) that it would
like others to believe is now the most significant issue of all. Indeed,
outrage can terminate the dialogic exchange that is at the heart of
Gadamer’s meaningful communication because it is so vocal that it
can overwhelm the other’s ability to speak openly and in the spirit of
a truthful exchange.300 In other words, outrage can exhaust so that
those exposed to it are no longer in any position to engage meaning-
fully in a conversation.301
297. By “violence” I understand an expansive definition that includes both verbal acts
as well as physical acts. See Duane Rudolph, How Violence Killed an American Labor
Union, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1407, 1411 (2015).
298. David Remnick, The Cruelty and Cynicism of Trump’s Transgender Ban, NEW
YORKER (July 26, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-cruelty-and
-cynicism-of-trumps-transgender-military-ban [http://perma.cc/KTE6-39UW]. On outrage
as a smokescreen, see Courtney Weaver, Donald Trump’s tweets are weapons of mass
distraction, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3dc733fa-a1fb
-11e7-b797-b61809486fe2 [http://perma.cc/3Q8J-7YVS].
299. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
300. See JEFFREY M. BERRY & SARAH SOBIERAJ, THE OUTRAGE INDUSTRY 6 (2014) (finding
“that outrage tactics such as ideological selectivity, vilification of opponents, and fear
mongering make talking politics beyond our most intimate circles extraordinarily difficult,
complicating our ability to have meaningful discussions about politics in our communities”).
301. See Lee Drutman, How to Combat Trump Fatigue Syndrome, VOX (May 17, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2017/3/7/14844120/how-to-fight-trump-fatigue-syndrome;
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Given these dangers, the issue arises regarding when it is appro-
priate to deploy moral outrage in our legal system.302 Under the
paradigm I propose, judicial outrage of the kind I envisage must be
reserved for specific circumstances in which individuals from identi-
fiable and vulnerable communities are under attack or risk being
under attack. Such communities include women and those who face
religious intolerance. Under my reading, outrage will not be a smoke-
screen because it will protect identified dignitary interests. It will
not divert attention because it will focus on specific vulnerability at
law and in society and will attempt to remedy it. Finally, outrage will
only end discussion to the extent that any judicial opinion can (in
other words, it cannot).
The goal, thus, of moral outrage in a judicial opinion will not be
to exhaust any litigant or reader of a particular judicial opinion but to
commit judges to the upholding of the inherent dignity of vulnerable
litigants by strengthening the range of remedies available to the disen-
franchised. In this context, expressions of moral outrage will reinvigo-
rate in the process the conversation that has closed or become blocked.
IV. THIS MOMENT IN MORAL OUTRAGE
Gadamer reminds us that interpretation involves a dialogic ex-
change whose goal it is to transcend the barriers that would thwart
meaningful conversation.303 Outrage can thus be considered to speak
to the other loudly so as to pierce the other’s inability to hear in this
moment and make such a dialogic exchange possible because this
moment presents a number of dangerous issues (raised, for example,
by the Sheridan, Abercrombie, and Pion facts) that affect and dam-
age so many lives in the United States, as they have done for a long
time.304 Sexism/misogyny is such a pressing issue. Sexism/misogyny
is present in the domestic violence that Susan Sheridan suffered, in
the background of Abercrombie’s treatment of Samantha Elauf, and
it is also present in the Pion case.305 Religious intolerance is another.
In the Abercrombie case, Islamophobia specifically and religious in-
tolerance more generally are on display.306 Outrage requires the
court to talk to the litigant and to the party who are in violation of
Jessi Hempel, The Problem with #MeToo and Viral Outrage, WIRED (Oct. 10, 2017), https://
www.wired.com/story/the-problem-with-me-too-and-viral-outrage/ [http://perma.cc
/LA6H-SVHS].
302. BERRY & SOBIERAJ, supra note 300, at 6.
303. See supra Part II.
304. BERRY & SOBIERAJ, supra note 300, at 6.
305. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1275 (N.D.
Okla. 2011); Pion v. Bean, 833 A.2d 1248, 1259 (Vt. 2003); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589
A.2d 1067, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
306. See Abercrombie, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
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the other’s inherent dignity. Here, I begin by recognizing that outrage
is a fixture of this particular moment in the United States before I
look specifically at the sexism/misogyny and Islamophobia (religious
intolerance) that are also omnipresent in this moment’s horizon and
that are deserving of expressions of moral outrage.
A. This Moment in Moral Outrage
The present political and cultural moment is one of perpetual
outrage. The president is constantly outraged, so much so that he
communicates his displeasure to the world at all hours and, in the
process, outrages others.307 Members of Congress and their constitu-
ents are outraged by this president and this moment in time.308
Members of both parties are outraged at each other, so much so that
they are shocked, shocked, that the other party and its supporters are
doing what they are doing, which is an incomprehensible way of doing
things, after all.309 Newspapers are appalled, appalled, at what things
have come to under these leaders in this moment in time.310 Ameri-
cans are disgusted, disgusted, at how bad things are in Washington
[D.C.].311 To live in the United States in this moment is to be angry,
appalled, disgusted, indignant, shocked—that is, outraged—about
something, some things, or about everything. Indeed, to not be
307. Stephen Castle, Trump’s Tweets Manage a Rare Feat: Uniting Britain, in Outrage,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/europe/trump
-tweets-uk-visit.html [http://perma.cc/G82H-NDC8]; see Ben Jacobs, Trump Uses Twitter
to Bash New York Times Coverage and Letter to Subscribers, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/13/trump-twitter-new-york-times [http://
perma.cc/7AH2-DWD7].
308. See Burgess Everett & Rachel Bade, Conservatives Floored by Trump’s Gun
Control Lovefest, POLITICO (March 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/01/
trump-gun-control-conservatives-gop-nra-432783 [http://perma.cc/B68U-2TTG]; Tom
Howell, Jr., Conservatives outraged at Trump’s Funding to Subsidize Obamacare Insurers,
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/feb/18/don
ald-trumps-obamacare-funds-anger-conservatives/ [http://perma.cc/35XM-EGYR].
309. See Nicholas Kristof, You’re Wrong! I’m Right!, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/opinion/sunday/liberal-conservative-divide.html [http://
perma.cc/82A6-3ZRN]; Sean Sullivan, Sen. Orrin Hatch Apologizes for Calling Obamacare
Supporters ‘Dumbass’ People, WASH. POST (March 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/03/02/sen-orrin-hatch-apologizes-for-calling-obamacare
-supporters-dumbass-people/?utm_term=.8c46ceb5d817 [http://perma.cc/3VYH-F2CT].
310. Paul Krugman, The Uses of Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/02/27/opinion/the-uses-of-outrage.html [http://perma.cc/CN4A-B3A3]; see
Trump’s ‘Best People’ and Their Dubious Ethics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/opinion/trump-best-people-ethics.html [http://perma.cc/8ZYP
-64MU].
311. See Alan Greenblatt, Voters Angry at Washington Gridlock May Want to Look in
the Mirror, NPR (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/10/01/162
084449/voters-angry-at-washington-gridlock-may-want-to-look-in-the-mirror [http://
perma.cc/C4J5-BAG8].
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outraged about something—even at the amount of outrage in public
discourse—might be considered somewhat anomalous at this mo-
ment in time.
B. This Moment in Sexism/Misogyny
Sexism/misogyny stubbornly persists with often violent results
for women and those identified as women. Sexism/misogyny goes to
the heart of the traditions that shape us as interpreters and the prej-
udices that we bring to bear in reading legal texts. Sexism/misogyny
also goes to the definitions of inherent dignity that we support as
worthy of the world in which we want to live, a world in which women
and those likened to women should not be demeaned. Legislators have
sometimes responded to the discriminatory treatment of women.312
Courts and commentators have documented its nefarious effects in
the American workplace.313 American newspapers continue to docu-
ment its effects in this moment of American life.314 I look at each of
these briefly in turn since they, too, characterize the present horizon
under a Gadamerian reading.
Various laws in recent years have identified some of the issues
that women in American life continue to face.315 At the federal level,
the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 provides
support for women who are victims of rape, domestic violence,
dating violence, stalking, as well as support for Native Americans,
immigrant women, lesbians, and women with disabilities.316 The
Affordable Care Act requires health insurance companies to pay for
birth control without copays or deductibles.317 The Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009 targets compensation discrimination to which
women are still widely subjected.318 Similarly, a number of states
312. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
127 Stat. 54 (2013) (codified in scattered portions of 42 U.S.C.).
313. See, e.g., Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Willamette
Tree Wholesale, Inc., No. CV 09-690-PK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25464, at *14–17 (D. Or.
Mar. 14, 2011).
314. Kahan, supra note 11, at 607 (observing that reliance on newspapers is useful
when discussing public morality, values, and social meaning):
I thus draw liberally on media reports, op-ed pieces, and letters to the
editor, as well as legislative histories and judicial opinions, not because I
believe (necessarily) that the arguments made in them are persuasive, but
because the sentiments they express provide evidence of how the public
perceives alternative sanctions.
315. Indeed, the argument here is not that these laws are sufficient to address the
problems that women face, but that the existence of these laws displays some of the
issues that women face in American life.
316. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013.
317. Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2019).
318. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified
in scattered portions of 42 U.S.C.).
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have also moved against compensation discrimination.319 Legislators
have thus identified these acts as prejudicial to women, and such
acts are part of the horizon that both judges and litigants bring to
judicial proceedings.
Courts and commentators have similarly acknowledged that the
prejudicial treatment of women is ongoing. They have discussed
sexism/misogyny in employment discrimination cases, which includes
various forms of discrimination against women in the American work-
place.320 Women are sexually assaulted, harassed, insulted, passed
over for promotion, and paid less than men, among other workplace
problems.321 Women are denied employment, lose their jobs when
pregnant, are not paid when on maternity leave in most states, and
they are deemed less diligent and less intelligent solely on the basis
of their status as women.322 These are some of the recalcitrant
issues that are deeply rooted in this moment’s horizon.
American newspapers document many of the same issues. They
report that the presidency itself has taints of sexism/misogyny.323
319. See State Equal Pay Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/re
search/labor-and-employment/equal-pay-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/EB2W-WH69] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019).
320. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1
(1979); Meredith Render, Misogyny, Androgyny, and Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimi-
nation in a Gender-Deconstructed World, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 99–100 (2006); Abigail
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American and French Law, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1091, 1091 (2000); Abigail C. Saguy,
Employment Discrimination or Sexual Violence: Defining Sexual Harassment in Ameri-
can and French Law, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1091, 1091 (2000).
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Wholesale, Inc., No. CV 09-690-PK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25464 at *14; Stoll v. Runyon,
165 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999). For denial of promotion, see Ángel González, Costco
Settles Promotion Lawsuit for $8M, Vows Reforms, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 7, 2013), https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/costco-settles-promotion-lawsuit-for-8m-vows-reforms/
[https://perma.cc/PRV8-QXCY]. On pay inequity, see Pay Equity & Discrimination, INST.
FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, https://iwpr.org/issue/employment-education-economic
-change/pay-equity-discrimination [http://perma.cc/JJU5-GVFN] (last visited Nov. 24,
2019).
322. On denial of employment, see Walmart to Pay More than $11.7 Million To Settle
EEOC Sex Discrimination Suit, U. S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (March 1, 2010),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-1-10.cfm [http://perma.cc/8NGC-EVXM]. On
pregnancy discrimination, see Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015). On unpaid ma-
ternity leave, see State Family and Medical Leave Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., http://
www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-family-and-medical-leave-laws.aspx
[http://perma.cc/CQJ9-ET3Y] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). On stereotypes regarding preg-
nant women, see Charlotte N. Sweeney & Rachel E. Ellis, Family Responsibility Discrimi-
nation: Enforcing the Rights of Caregivers in the Workplace, 41 COLO. LAWYER 39, 40
(Oct. 2012). On derogatory comments regarding women’s intelligence, see, for example,
Collins v. Clark County Fire Dist. No. 5, 231 P.3d at 1217 (female employees described
as “ ‘stupid wom[e]n,’ ‘stupid bitch[es],’ and ‘lying bitch[es]’ ”).
323. See Jill Filipovic, Donald Trump and His Work Wives, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/opinion/donald-trump-and-his-work-wives.html
[http://perma.cc/K98D-WCLS]; Michael Tackett, Trump’s Combative Denials Again Draw
2020] OF MORAL OUTRAGE IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 381
Congress and the judiciary similarly struggle with these issues.324
Newspapers also tell us that men who have sexually assaulted women
have received lenient sentences.325 Newspapers recount the story of
a doctor entrusted with the medical care of hundreds of young female
athletes that represent our country whom the doctor sexually assaults
over several years.326 A number of prominent men are also said to
have sexually assaulted and discriminated against women.327 These
are some of the pressing issues in this moment, in this horizon, facing
cases like Sheridan, Abercrombie, and Pion and the courts under-
standing, interpreting and applying the law to them.
C. This Moment in Religious Intolerance
Islamophobia and religious intolerance of the type evoked in
Abercrombie are similarly deeply embedded in this moment.328 Mus-
lims are assumed to be un-American, terrorists, and they are widely
discriminated against.329 Muslims abroad are also presumed to be
terror threats and the executive may now enforce bans against their
entry to the United States.330 Religious intolerance in this moment
Him into the Sexual Harassment Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/12/12/us/politics/trump-blames-democrats-for-false-accusations-from
-women.html [http://perma.cc/FZ72-5KKZ].
324. See Grace Guarnieri, Federal Courts to Track Sexual Harassment in Wake of Mis-
conduct Allegations, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 21, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/us-courts
-track-sexual-harassment-814668 [http://perma.cc/5DYR-G2QL]; Martha Nussbaum, The
Roots of Male Rage, on Show at the Kavanaugh Hearing, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/09/29/the-roots-of-male
-rage-on-show-at-the-kavanaugh-hearing/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2f90cd000e69
[http://perma.cc/2MUC-BZUE]; Evan Osnos, Deliberating Bodies: Sexism and Congress,
THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/de
liberating-bodies-sexism-congress [http://perma.cc/8HYQ-EMFK].
325. See Christine Hauser, Judge’s Sentencing in Massachusetts Sexual Assault Case
Reignites Debate on Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/08/25/us/david-becker-massachusetts-sexual-assault.html [http://perma.cc/R235-9C HV];
Danielle Paquette, What Makes the Stanford Sex Offender’s Six Month Jail Sentence so
Unusual, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp
/2016/06/06/what-makes-the-stanford-sex-offenders-six-month-jail-sentence-so-unusual
/?utm_term=.16732852bb7b [http://perma.cc/K6RA-WWPR].
326. Rebecca Davis O’Brien & Louise Radnofsky, Former USA Gymnastics Doctor
Larry Nassar Sentenced to Up to 175 Years for Sexual Abuse, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-u-s-gymnastics-doctor-larry-nassar-sentenced-to-up
-to-175-years-for-sexual-abuse-1516815868 [http://perma.cc/L8VA-W5XM].
327. Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct and
Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/20
17/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html [http://perma.cc/XM23-AKT6].
328. See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamaphobia Has a Long History in the US, BBC
NEWS MAG. (Sept. 29, 2015), http:www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34385051 [http://perma
.cc/KY4Y-6MQA].
329. Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslim Bans” and the (Re)Making of Political Islamophobia,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1738 (2017).
330. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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has also deeply affected the Jewish community as anti-Semitism
surges, and religious intolerance also damages and makes life dif-
ficult for members of other minority communities.331
Commentators remind us that Islamophobia has long been a
phenomenon in America.332 Muslims are attacked, as are their sacred
spaces, and their allegiance to the country of their birth, or to their
adopted home (as the case may be), the United States, is often ques-
tioned.333 Muslims are forced to overcome suspicion regarding their
belonging, their commitment to democratic values, failing which
they are considered un-American and terrorists.334 Islamophobia is
damaging because it renders members of a religious group suspect
and suspicious.335 Islamophobia also identifies all Muslims as potential
threats to American values with real consequences for how Muslims
in America must order their lives.336
The Jewish community similarly faces intolerance. Courts and
commentators have documented the pernicious continuing effects of
anti-Semitism.337 Jewish sacred grounds have been desecrated and
the Jewish community is subject to hate speech and other forms of
violence.338 Anti-Semitism is damaging and Jews are made to fear for
their safety in their own country, their own home, or in their adopted
331. On rising anti-Semitism, see Maggie Astor, Anti-Semitic Incidents Surged 57
Percent in 2017, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/02/27/us/anti-semitism-adl-report.html [http://perma.cc/JHQ2-U8L6]. On religious intoler-
ance, see Peter Holley, How the United States Became a ‘Second-Tier’ Country, WASH.
POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/22
/rising-intolerance-makes-the-united-states-a-second-tier-country-new-study-finds /?utm
_term=.8ced59658ef1 [http://perma.cc/MJR3-2Z9E].
332. Beydoun, supra note 328.
333. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework,
116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 108, 112–13, 116–17 (2016).
334. See generally Beydoun, supra note 329.
335. Id. at 1737, 1747, 1773.
336. Id. at 1739, 1757.
337. See, e.g., Slade ex rel. G.D.S. v. Northport–East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist.,
915 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Jewish high school student subjected to a variety
of anti-Semitic slurs, including: “Jew”, “Hey, Jew”, and being told “ ‘Jews are disgusting,’
‘You dumb Jew,’ ‘Being Jewish must suck,’ ‘Hitler was a good person,’ ‘My love for you
burns like a thousand Jews in an oven’ . . . ‘What’s the difference between a Jew and a
pizza? A pizza doesn’t scream when it goes into the oven.’ ”); Kenneth L. Marcus, Juris-
prudence of the New Anti-Semitism, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371 (2009).
338. Kayla Epstein, The Disturbing History of Vandalizing Jewish Cemeteries, WASH.
POST (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/02/21
/the-disturbing-history-of-vandalizing-jewish-cemeteries/?utm_term=.088e7db95f52
[http://perma.cc/U387-UE2P]; Meghan E. Irons, Hate Group and Anti-Semitic Incidents
Rose During Trump’s first year, reports find, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www
.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/02/27/anti-semitic-incidents-spiked-last-year-mass-adl-says
/oTDjIZCimm4XE63UXNCPAJ/story.html [http://perma.cc/8RB9-7C6Z]; Ian Simpson,
Philadelphia Jewish cemetery desecrated by vandals, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2017), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-cemetery/philadelphia-jewish-cemetery-dese
crated-by-vandals-idUSKBN1650Y8 [http://perma.cc/7B53-UHCP].
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home, as the case may be. These forms of vicious intolerance, and
others, are deeply embedded in our current horizon and they must
be acknowledged and resisted as prejudices and even traditions that
exist in this current moment.
V. APPLICATION OF MORAL OUTRAGE
It is one thing to recognize that women and minority religious
communities are at risk but another to state how moral outrage
should apply in judicial opinions in cases involving women and
minority religious communities. Should all outraged opinions in-
clude Sheridan-type exclamation points?339 Might [outraged] silence
be an expression of outrage, as in Kansas?340 Would it be preferable
instead to award the requested remedy (like in Pion) and simply
characterize the facts as “egregious”?341 Maybe Abercrombie’s approach
is best because not even the word “egregious” appears in the opinion
yet the aggrieved party gets a damages award and wins the case?342
Whatever approach a judge deploys as her own horizon fuses with
those of the case before her, it should be apparent from her judicial
opinion that the court is expressing public outrage on behalf of a com-
munity or class to which a particular litigant belongs and is making
certain traditions and prejudices explicit in an effort to combat and
overcome them. Given outrage’s distinctive vociferation, expression
of moral outrage is right where a community or class has been at risk,
is currently is at risk, or is likely to be at risk of being muted or si-
lenced. That is, I propose a model for the expression of moral outrage
that would reserve its expression for cases involving communities
or classes at risk, like women or religious minorities.
A. Community or Class
Central to my analysis is the emphasis on a community or class
that has historically been threatened or at risk, is currently threat-
ened or at risk, or that is likely to be threatened or at risk. Such a
focus addresses both ingrained traditions or prejudices as well as
nascent prejudices against a given group or community. The focus on
the community or class and not on the particular litigant is meant
to emphasize that the harm in a given case (in which moral outrage
must be expressed) is a dignitary harm against a class of individuals
of which this individual is a part, and the community of which she
339. See Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1071 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
340. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (U.S. 2015).
341. See generally Pion v. Bean, 833 A.2d 1248 (Vt. 2003).
342. EEOC v. Abercrombie, 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013). But see id. at 1248.
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is a part needs heightened judicial protection at this moment in time.
The harm done by the aggressor in such a case is, more importantly,
an attack on public morality, which privileges open communication. To
provide as much interpretive flexibility as possible to judges and juries
under the circumstances, I use both “community or class” in my test.
Courts and commentators have already identified a number of
communities or classes at risk. Immigrants and immigrant workers
are vulnerable communities.343 Women can constitute an “especially
vulnerable group.”344 Racial minorities are part of vulnerable com-
munities.345 Gays and lesbians are part of a community at risk.346
The transgender community is particularly at risk.347 Prisoners can
be part of a community at risk.348 The disabled, the elderly, and the
poor have also been identified as “traditionally vulnerable.”349 That is,
these are the kinds of communities, constituencies, or groups that
have been historically threatened and that are still at risk.350 Immi-
grants, women, racial minorities, sexual minorities, the disabled,
343. See Mendoza v. Ruesga, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 613–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2008)
(identifying “immigrants seeking legal residency in the United States” as a “particularly
vulnerable population”); Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational
Safety and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479, 483 (2009).
344. Robert R. M. Verchik, Katrina, Feminism, and Environmental Justice, 13 CARDOZO
J. L. & GENDER 791, 797 (2008).
345. See, e.g., United States v. Bakenhus, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15320, at *10 (6th Cir.
1997) (“In this case, the minority status of the victims in Clarksville, a predominantly white
community, and [defendant’s] purposeful attack against them because of their minority
status, justifies the district court’s determination that these victims were uncommonly
vulnerable to the defendant’s acts.”); Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes
African Americans to Police Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (2016).
346. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (“Especially against a long history
of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry
works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and les-
bians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”).
347. Irina D. Manta, Choosing Privacy, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 687–88
(2017) (“In many ways, the transgender community is the most vulnerable group in the
LGBT movement”); see also Sarah McBride, HRC & Trans People of Color Coalition
Release Report on Violence Against the Transgender Community, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN
(Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-trans-people-of-color-coalition-release-re
port-on-violence-against-the [http://perma.cc/XPY2-JYZP].
348. On prisoners, see, for example, Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1312 (11th Cir.
2004) noting that:
If a requested exemption from health or safety rules is so serious as to place
members of the prison community at risk, [federal law] allows [the state] to
deny the exemption so long as the challenged rule serves a compelling in-
terest, such as prison safety, and the challenged rule is the least restrictive
means of serving that interest.
349. Max Stul Oppenheimer, Return of the Poll Tax: Does Technological Progress
Threaten 200 Years of Advances Toward Electoral Equality?, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 1027,
1063 (2009).
350. Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 102–08
(2017).
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the elderly and the poor have faced long histories of discrimination—
often hundreds of years deep—and the attacks on them continue.351
Does my analysis foreclose the possibility of new vulnerable
communities, classes, or groups arising over time? No. Disadvantaged
classes tend to change over time, meaning that today’s vulnerable
could very well be tomorrow’s victimizers. Outrage also has a way
of creating new communities of its own. It is adept at bringing people
together, often across boundaries of all sorts, and it effortlessly co-
alesces them into a hive of actors who demand action on behalf of a
particular cause. Recall, for example, the discovery of a drowned
Syrian toddler on a Turkish beach whose family had fled war or the
case of the Zimbabwean lion that was killed by an American dentist
both of which cases elicited global uproar.352 The outrage in both
cases—one a human rights case and the other an animal rights
case—brought together people across the globe who demanded
action.353 Outrage thus creates communities, however transitory,
that come together in the service of a cause. If those communities were
imperiled in some way by the actions of an aggressor, my analysis
would embrace the expression of outrage on their behalf, even if the
only thing that held them together was their moral outrage for a
sliver of time.
Applying this insight about communities and classes to Sheridan
and Kansas, it becomes even more evident that Sheridan misdi-
rected its moral outrage and that Kansas was right not to express
any outrage. Sheridan identified the state and federal governments
as “potential innocent entities” in the case.354It expressed moral
outrage because it held that “[i]n this state, courts will not allow
wrongdoers to enrich themselves as a result of their own criminal
acts at the expense of an innocent party.”355 That is, the innocent
victims in Sheridan were the state and federal governments—
neither of which is a community, class, or group that faced a long
history of discriminatory animus as a matter of law, public policy,
or societal bias either at the moment Sheridan was decided or at the
present moment.356 Kansas similarly does not present a community
351. See, e.g., id.
352. On Syria, see If These Images Don’t Change Europe, What Will?, AL JAZEERA
(Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/images-don-change-europe-1509
02220504564.html [http://perma.cc/V78V-KZDE]. On Zimbabwe, see Walter J Palmer, DDS,
YELP, http://www.yelp.com/biz/walter-j-palmer-dds-minneapolis [http://perma.cc/V9A7
-AE95] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019); see also Kevin Drum, For a Week, Walter Palmer is the
Worst Human Being Ever in History, MOTHER JONES (July 30, 2015), http://www.mother
jones.com/kevin-drum/2015/07/week-walter-palmer-worst-human-being-ever-history.
353. If These Images Don’t Change Europe, What Will?, supra note 352.
354. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1074 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
355. Id.
356. But see Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 387 (1960)
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or constituency historically at threat or under sustained attack, even
if does present Kansas as a victim of Nebraska’s willful “misbehavior”
for the second time in roughly a decade.357
Similarly, Abercrombie was wrong not to express moral outrage
on Ms. Elauf’s behalf. Ms. Elauf was a young Muslim woman who
sought employment in a potentially hostile state, her home state,
Oklahoma, from an employer indisposed to her.358 Bringing into
relief this aspect of Ms. Elauf’s particular horizon and horizon facing
her, the trial court observed that “Elauf has, since age 13, worn the
head scarf consistently and continuously when in public or in the
presence of men who are strangers—this despite the fact that she
resides in Tulsa, Oklahoma.”359 Given, therefore, the particular tra-
ditions and prejudices to which women and Muslims are still subject
in the United States, and especially in Oklahoma, Ms. Elauf would
meet the proposed test’s requirement for the expression of moral
outrage on her behalf. That is, as a Muslim and a woman, Ms. Elauf
is part of a community or class that was historically threatened or
at risk, is currently threatened or at risk, and, in her particular case,
that is likely to be continuously threatened or at risk.
Indeed, relying on similar reasoning, Sheridan should have ex-
pressed moral outrage for Suzanne E. Sheridan. Mrs. Sheridan was a
battered woman who lived with an abusive spouse who refused to
work.360 Given the existence of sexism and possible misogyny in the
case, and the physical nature of the humiliation that Mrs. Sheridan
suffered at home, Suzanne E. Sheridan would qualify as being from a
community or class historically threatened or at risk, is currently
threatened or at risk, and, in her particular case, from her a commu-
nity or class that is likely to be continuously threatened or at risk.361
Moral outrage should have issued for Suzanne E. Sheridan and
women like her, which the Sheridan court failed to do.362
B. Muted or Silenced
Given the fact that outrage speaks loudly (and some might add
stridently) in the service of a given cause, an additional requirement
for the expression of moral outrage would be that the community or
class in question must either have been historically muted or silenced,
is currently muted or silenced, or is likely at risk of being muted or
(holding that state property taxes levied against a private lessee of federal property uncon-
stitutionally discriminated against the United States).
357. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1055 (U.S. 2015).
358. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2013).
359. Id. at 1278 (emphasis added).
360. Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1075.
361. See id.
362. See id.
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silenced, which explains the need for the court to state a position
emphatically on that community’s behalf at this point in time.
Women and religious minorities have faced long histories of si-
lencing. Historically, women have been systematically silenced and
there are indications that they continue to be silenced.363 Similarly,
the religiously intolerant have historically silenced religious minori-
ties, often in horrendous ways.364 Attacks on Jewish and Muslim
sacred spaces, to name a few, continue this tradition of attempted
silencing, indicating that both communities are in continuous peril
of being muted or silenced, given the attacks on both communities
in the United States.365 Outrage thus speaks out against such at-
tempts at muting a class of marginalized individuals.
C. Emphatic Remedy
Outrage, under my reading, will thus arise as its own remedy,
applicable both at law and at equity. While some remedies are clas-
sified as monetary (damages, for example) and others as coercive
(injunctions, for example), outrage might be classified as its own
kind of remedy, an emphatic remedy that both emboldens the grant
of all other remedies and that reinforces them as well. Outrage would
thus be the remedy behind the remedy (a hermeneutic remedy, as it
were), which would enhance the monetary value of a damages award,
expand the scope of an injunction, and still leave to the judge’s
discretion written expression moral outrage in the Sheridan fashion,
as well. Take, for example, the award of punitive damages—an out-
rage remedy—in the Pion case.366 The Supreme Court of Vermont
upheld the award of $5,000 against Mr. Pion and $25,000 against
Mrs. Pion.367 The court held that actual malice had been found in
the case to support such an award and that actual malice required
363. See Susan Faludi, The Patriarchs are Falling. The Patriarchy is Stronger than
Ever., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/sunday
/patriarchy-feminism-metoo.htm [http://perma.cc/N6G8-MJPA]; Lani Guinier et al., Be-
coming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
65 (1994); Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal
Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 847, 849–50
(2000); Amy B. Wang, “Nevertheless, she persisted” becomes new battle cry after McConnell
silences Elizabeth Warren, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/08/nevertheless-she-persisted-becomes-new-battle-cry-af
ter-mcconnell-silences-elizabeth-warren/?utm_term=.373d1780332e [http://perma.cc
/R9LC-H9QE].
364. See, e.g., Hatem Bazian, Countering Islamophobia Means Ending the Structural
Silencing of Muslim Voices—Including Their Critique of Israel, MONDOWEISS (Mar. 22,
2017), https://mondoweiss.net/2017/03/countering-islamophobia-structural [http://perma
.cc/968G-2S2P].
365. Id.
366. Pion v. Bean, 833 A.2d 1248 (Vt. 2003).
367. Id.
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“[a] showing of conduct manifesting personal ill will or carried out
under circumstances evidencing insult or oppression, or even by con-
duct showing a reckless or wanton disregard of one’s rights’ will
suffice.’ ”368 Under my analysis, the Pions’ sexist/misogynist comments
targeting of women in that case would satisfy my “community or
class” and the “muted or silenced” requirements. The victims in the
Pion case would thus be the kinds of litigants for whom the model pro-
posed here would reinforce the case for an outrage remedy.
Because my test identifies who gets the presumption that an
outrage remedy should apply (without establishing that they do merit
that remedy under a given set of facts), the litigants claiming an out-
rage remedy would still have to meet the test for the remedy they
seek. In the Pion case, for example, for punitive damages to be issued
the plaintiffs would still have to show actual malice to the satisfac-
tion of the trier of fact.369 Nevertheless, having met actual malice the
test for an outrage remedy, the victims in the Pion case could see their
punitive and other damages awards enhanced and an expression of
moral outrage issue on their behalf.370
Such enhancement of a remedy already exists for civil rights vio-
lations and hate crimes in American law.371 The jury could be in-
structed that once they have found that actual malice has been met
(as required under Vermont law for an award of punitive damages, for
example) they may (to adapt current language applicable in Ver-
mont) “in determining the amount of punitive damages, consider the
defendant’s actions against this particular individual from a com-
munity or class at risk in our society. [They] may also consider the
fact that by targeting this individual in this manner the defendant has
sought to silence the community or class at risk to which this indi-
vidual belongs, and [they] may increase the size of [their] penalty to
a level that [they] deem appropriate under these circumstances.”372
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1248–49.
370. Pion, 833 A.2d at 1249.
371. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968; 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1968); Violent Crime and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994(; United States v. Pagán-Ferrer, 736 F.3d
573, 590–91 (1st Cir. 2013) (upholding enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 242 in case in-
volving civil rights violation that resulted in death of the victim); see also State-by-State
Hate Crime Laws, NAACP (2017), https://www.naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09
/Hate-Crimes-laws-by-state.pdf; Anti-Defamation League State Hate Crime Statutory Pro-
visions, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/as
sets/pdf/combating-hate/2014-adl-updated-state-hate-crime-statutes.pdf.
372. Adapted from VERMONT CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITTEE, Plain English Jury
Instructions, § 11 Damages, VT. BAR ASSOC., http://www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/Files/Web
Pages/Attorney%20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructions/damages.htm#11.19
[http://perma.cc/8XAJ-727G] (“In determining the amount of punitive damages, you should
consider the character and standing of [Name of Defendant], [his/her/its] financial status,
and the degree of malice or wantonness in [his/her/its] acts.”).
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Such an instruction would take the focus off the defendant, as
appears to be currently the case under Vermont law, and would place
it where it should be: on the plaintiff’s and her community’s suffering.
Given constitutional preferences for punitive damage awards that
are not excessive, the jury’s punitive damages award could be re-
viewed for conformity with constitutional precedent.373 A dignitarian
turn in our jurisprudence requires of us the upholding of the inher-
ent dignity of vulnerable groups because such groups are pivotal to
the kinds of public discourse, conversation, and dialog we would like
to thrive in our society and legal system.
CONCLUSION
Far from a request that a court “yell” at a litigant at a given point
in time, moral outrage would instead require a court to speak audi-
bly on behalf of a class or community at risk because all other
attempts at conversation have failed up to this moment in time.
Gadamer’s hermeneutic insights situate all parties to a judicial
proceeding in time, and they invite such parties to face and transcend
the nefarious effects of their particular traditions and prejudices.
Because it pierces the other’s inability to hear or appreciate the suf-
fering of its interlocutor, which suffering she has been trying to bring
to the surface of her communicative ability, outrage helps the vulnera-
ble speak beyond the barriers imposed by antagonistic traditions
and prejudices. The effect of the outrage remedy would be to make
evident the dignity of the vulnerable in both our legal and public dis-
course by assuring the vulnerable that even at their weakest, their
most susceptible—when they might not be able to speak on their own
behalf—their judicial system can and will act as their mouthpiece.
The outrage model presented in this Article builds on the exis-
tence of moral outrage in our legal system and the Article assumes
that moral outrage need not be—and is not—an unruly element of
our legal system if conscripted and channeled appropriately. The
idea, therefore, is not only to empower vulnerable litigants as they
appear before their judicial system after being exposed to long and
difficult and painful histories of discrimination, but also to empower
judges to do what they already do, but, openly, transparently, and
within a remedial framework that serves the ends of social justice.
After all, what is a remedy if not the ability to hear someone, to listen
to her as she speaks, and in response to agree to the truth that she
presents about her community’s continued marginalization whose
suffering we are committed to ending?
373. Shahi v. Madden, 5 A.3d 869 (Vt. 2010).
